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Should The Proud Dragon Repent? 
A Relative Theory for China’s State Capitalist Banking 
Sector Based On East Asia’s Experience 
 
YUEH-PING (ALEX) YANG* 
 
Abstract 
 
Amidst the U.S.-China trade war, China’s banking sector, the backbone 
of China’s economy, plays a key role in this battle.  China’s banking sector, 
however, poses a puzzle to contemporary studies of state-owned banks 
(“SBs”).  According to the property right theory, the mainstream SB theory, 
SBs are negative for the financial and economic development of an economy 
because it is susceptible to more serious agency problems, excessive political 
intervention, and conflict of interest between state regulators and state 
owners.  That said, the economic success of China, whose banks are mostly 
owned and controlled by the Chinese party-state supports the development 
theory, a minority theory that highlights the development function of SBs in 
mobilizing domestic investible funds to support strategic industries.   
To have a clearer understanding of China’s banking sector, I engage in 
the debate between the property right theory and the development theory by 
comparing the experience of four East Asian developmental states, Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.  After comprehensively reviewing the 
banking evolution in these economies, I put forward a “relative theory” to 
account for SBs.  I argue that the relative success and failure depends on the 
relative efficiency of the state sector vis-à-vis the private sector in promoting 
development.  In the early stage of an economy’s development, the private 
sector might have collective action problems to come up with a coherent 
development policy for the economy; hence, the state sector is relatively 
better positioned in allocating the investible fund, and its ownership of banks 
thus promotes development.  Nevertheless, as an economy develops and the 
 
 * Assistant Professor at National Taiwan University Department of Law. Harvard Law 
School S.J.D. (2017). This paper was presented at the 4th Workshop on Comparative Business 
and Financial Law held by the American Society of Comparative Law Younger 
Comparativists Committee at Fordham Law School in February 2018. The author is grateful 
for the comments received on this paper from Professors Reinier H. Kraakman, Mark Wu, 
Virginia Harper Ho, Martin Gelter, Andrew Schwartz, Timothy Webster, Maria Lucia 
Passador, Christopher Chen, etc. The author can be reached at alexypyang@ntu.edu.tw.  
4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  2:38 PM 
260 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
corresponding institutions mature, the private sector might become relatively 
more efficient in allocating the investible fund, which demands the state to 
reduce its intervention in the banking sector.  According to this relative 
theory, the success of China’s SBs in promoting economic development 
might not be sustainable.  At some point, the Chinese party-state would need 
to readjust its role.  That said, this does not necessarily lead to the 
privatization of SBs in China.  As East Asia’s experience suggests, there may 
be a variety of ways for China to transition to a banking system that is less 
dominated by the party-state.  The current trade war might offer this turning 
point as it evolves into a finance war. 
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A proud dragon repents; fullness is not sustainable!! 
                   — The Book of Changes, Qian Diagram 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The U.S.-China trade war has gradually evolved into a finance war.  
Trade sanctions adopted by the United States not only impacted directly on 
the trade performance of Chinese business sectors but also threatened the 
stability of China’s financial sectors indirectly.  The near-bankruptcy of 
Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Co. (“ZTE”) in 2018 after the 
United States banned its companies from selling hardware and software to 
ZTE illustrated the financial impact of the trade war on Chinese enterprises.1  
After several bankruptcy cases emerged in China in 2018, the Supreme 
People’s Court of China also warned that the trade war might lead to a 
bankruptcy wave among Chinese enterprises.2  As the risk of corporate 
bankruptcy escalates, the threat to Chinese commercial banks, the major 
creditors of China’s corporate sectors, has also become increasingly real.  
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), China’s largest bank, 
admitted in 2018 that the trade war had the potential of threatening the bank 
stability.3  Recently, the United States has started to aim at China’s banking 
sector even more directly.  In 2019, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia found three large Chinese commercial banks in contempt because 
they refused to comply with subpoenas in investigating violations of North 
 
 1. Jeb Su, How The U.S. Export Ban Effectively Bankrupts China’s Telecom Giant ZTE, 
FORBES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2018/04/17/how-the-u-s-
export-ban-effectively-bankrupts-chinas-telecom-giant-zte/#1b744041720c; Claire 
Ballentine, U.S. Lifts Ban That Kept ZTE From Doing Business With American Suppliers, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/business/zte-ban-trump 
.html. 
 2. Sidney Leng, Many Chinese Companies ‘Will Go Bankrupt’, If US Delivers on Tariff 
Threats, Court Newspaper Warns, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2156810/many-chinese-comp 
anies-will-go-bankrupt-if-us-delivers.  
 3. Engen Tham & Shu Zhang, China’s Top Bank ICBC Flags Trade War Risks as 
Profits Rise, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icbc-results/china 
s-top-bank-icbc-flags-trade-war-risks-as-profits-rise-idUSKCN1LF1W3; Evelyn Cheng, 
Beijing is Holding Firm, but Many Chinese Firms Acknowledge They’re Worried About the 
Trade War, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/12/us-china-trade-war-
many-chinese-firms-acknowledge-business-worries.html.  
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Korean sanctions,4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the fines.5  
Considering that this action can cut off these Chinese banks from the U.S. 
financial system, it has the potential to cause a panicking effect on China’s 
banking system.  In sum, as the U.S.-China trade war escalates, China’s 
financial sector might gradually become the next battlefield. 
China’s financial sector, featuring a gigantic banking sector dominated 
by the Chinese party-state,6 can be resilient or fragile.  Backed by the party-
state, Chinese commercial banks are less susceptible to market panics and 
runs.  The party-state’s leadership can further coordinate Chinese 
commercial banks to rescue troubled sectors and prevent financial 
turbulence.  In 2019, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(“CBIRC”), China’s banking and insurance regulator, directed Chinese 
commercial banks to support the under-financed rural areas.7  People’s Bank 
of China, the central bank of China, also indicated that it would coordinate 
China’s large SBs to finance leading securities firms to support China’s non-
banking financial sector.8  These instances illustrate the coordinating and 
rescuing functions of a banking system dominated by the party-state.  That 
said, the high leverage in China’s economy casts doubts on the capability of 
the Chinese party-state in supporting China’s economy.  After all, China’s 
total stock of corporate, household, and government debt has neared 304 
 
 4. Spencer S. Hsu, Chinese Bank Involved in Probe on North Korean Sanctions and 
Money Laundering Faces Financial ‘Death Penalty’, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/chinese-bank-involved-in-probe-on-north-kore 
an-sanctions-and-money-laundering-faces-financial-death-penalty/2019/06/22/0ccef3ba-81b 
e-11e9-bce7-40b4105f7ca0_story.html. 
 5. Spencer S. Hsu, In First, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Contempt Fines Against Three 
Chinese Banks in North Korean Sanctions Probe, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/in-first-us-appeals-court-upholds-contempt-fin 
es-against-three-chinese-banks-in-north-korean-sanctions-probe/2019/07/30/18585108-ae3 
8-11e9-8e77-03b30bc29f64_story.html. 
 6. For studies on China’s party-state-dominated banking sector, see Yueh-Ping (Alex) 
Yang, Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons on the Great Wall Street: Decoding the 
Corporate Governance of Chinese Commercial Banks, 28(1) WASH. INT’L L.J.1 (2019) 
[hereinafter “Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons”]; Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, The Cloud 
for Dragons and the Wind for Tigers: Bank Governance Reform in China and an Executive-
Based Proposal, 24(2) STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 47 (2019) [hereinafter “Cloud for Dragons and 
Wind for Tigers”]. 
 7. Norihiko Shirouzu & Yilei Sun, China Banking Regulators Tell Banks to Boost 
Support for Rural Economies, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/china-economy-loans-rural/china-banking-regulators-tell-banks-to-boost-support-for-
rural-economies-idUSL3N20X04N.  
 8. Liang Hong & Denise Jia, China Urges Big Brokerages to Support Smaller Non-
Banks, CAIXIN (June 18, 2019), https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-06-18/china-urges-big-
brokerages-to-support-smaller-non-banks-101428013.html.  
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percent of its gross domestic product (“GDP”) in the first quarter of 2019, 
which might keep climbing as the trade war continues.9  More troublingly, 
because the party-state intervenes in the lending decision of commercial 
banks for long, which compromises the loan quality, the rescuer itself might 
need to be rescued when the economy goes down.  In 2019, several Chinese 
commercial banks went into financial troubles: In May, Baoshang Bank 
became the first bank failure case in China over the past two decades, leading 
to CBIRC’s takeover.  Later on, Bank of Jinzhou, a Hong Kong-listed bank, 
encountered liquidity risks, leading to the suspension of the trading of its 
shares in Hong Kong.  Heng Feng Bank, one of the twelve national banks in 
China, further went into restructuring due to the credit crisis.10  These 
instances alarm the Chinese party-state that the cracks in the armor might be 
appearing. 
To better understand the strength and weakness of China’s banking 
sector, the theories of SBs can shed us more lights.  SBs have received more 
attention in the post-financial-crisis era.  For one thing, the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2008 (the “Global Financial Crisis”) highlighted the 
countercyclical function of SBs.  Much literature has devoted to examining 
how the state can use SBs to maintain credits during an economic recession 
and prevent cyclical credit crunches.11  For another, bank bailouts adopted 
by the Treasury of the United States heated the discussion.12  To provide 
 
 9. Amanda Lee, China’s Total Debt Rises to Over 300 Per cent of GDP as Beijing 
Loosens Borrowing Curbs to Boost Growth, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3018991/chinas-total-debt-rises-ov 
er-300-cent-gdp-beijing-loosens.  
 10. Orange Wang, China’s Small Banks Still Struggling to Obtain Funds to Lend Three 
Months After First Bank Failure in 20 Years, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 15, 2019), 
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3022948/chinas-small-banks-still-s 
truggling-obtain-funds-lend-three. 
 11. See e.g., Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc- Kunt, Rethinking the State’s Role in 
Finance, 13-15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6400, 2013); Ata Can 
Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks 
Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012); Eva 
Gutierrez et al., Development Banks: Role and Mechanisms to Increase their Efficiency, 8-9 
(World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 5729, 2011). See also Alejandro Micco & 
Ugo Panizza, Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior, 93 ECON. LETTER 248 (2006); Eduardo 
Levy Yeyati et al., A Reappraisal of State-owned Banks, 7(2) ECONOMIA 209, 224, 231-32 
(2007). 
 12. For related debates about the government ownership of banks in the U.S. context, 
see J. W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 
27:2 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government 
is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Barbara Black, The U.S. as 
“Reluctant Shareholder:” Government, Business, and the Law, 5:2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 561 (2010); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public 
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additional liquidity to credit markets and prevent failures of systemically 
important financial institutions, the U.S. Congress established the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) in October 2008,13 which resulted in the 
Treasury’s equity injection14 of around $205 billion into 707 financial 
institutions.15  The concession of the United States, the leader of the liberal 
camp, to state ownership of banks during the Global Financial Crisis 
evidences the practical importance of SBs.16 
Contemporary studies, however, generally discredit SBs.  The property 
right theorists argue that state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) incur more 
serious moral hazard problems and agency problems than private firms17 and 
thus suspect that the state can operate SBs efficiently.  Specifically, they have 
three major concerns.  First, SBs incur more serious agency problems 
because they are owned by the government which is essentially owned by all 
taxpayers and thus have the most dispersed ownership structure and most 
serious separation of ownership from control problem.18  Second, SBs 
 
Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62:4 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Matthew R. Shahabian, 
The Government as Shareholder and Political Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351 (2011); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is 
the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 409 (2010); 
Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The “Golden Share” Approach, 
68(4) ALABAMA L. REV. 1029 (2017); Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, Government Ownership of 
Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the United States?, 10(3) WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 
667 (2019). 
 13. For an introduction to the U.S. government’s investment under the TARP, see HAL 
S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND 
REGULATION 78-82 (21st ed., 2016). 
 14. Kahan & Rock indicated that the TARP originally aimed at stabilizing the financial 
system by authorizing the Treasury to engage in purchase of troubled assets from troubled 
financial institutions, but the Treasury took advantage of the broad definition of “troubled 
assets” to obtain the entitlement to purchase shares of troubled financial institutions.  Kahan 
& Rock, supra note 12, at 1309-10.  Shahabian also reviewed legislative history and suggested 
that Congress, when passing the TARP, intended equity purchase to be only a secondary tool 
to toxic assets purchase. Matthew R. Shahabian, supra note 12, at 357-58.  
 15. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program, http://www.treasury. 
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/programs/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchase 
program.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).  
 16. See IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN 
STATES AND CORPORATIONS? 21-22 (2010). 
 17. Related literature often cites Armen Alchian as the leading proponent of the property 
right theory. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II 
POLITICO 816 (1965). For other literature following this line, see Enrico Perotti, State 
Ownership: A Residual Role? (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3407, 2004). 
 18. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO 
816 (1965). For a summary of the agency problems intensified in GOBs, see I. Serdar Dinc, 
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typically implicate political intervention under which politicians influence 
SBs to serve their interests instead of public ones.19  Third, the government 
acts as both the regulator and owner of SBs and thus have conflicting 
interests which prevent it from providing a level playing field for all banks.20 
China, however, challenges the wisdom of contemporary studies.  
Compared with the United States and the European Union, which were 
seriously hit by the Global Financial Crisis, China’s economy was relatively 
successful.  Between 2010 and 2018, the world’s GDP grew by US$ 19.75 
trillion, of which China contributed US$7.52 trillion, or 38 percent of the 
world’s growth.21  Parallel to its economic success, China has maintained an 
authoritarian party-state regime dominated by the Chinese Communist Party 
(“CCP”).22  CCP heavily dominates China’s economy through the so-called 
“state capitalism” model.23  This model also extends to China’s banking 
sector.  Most major Chinese banks are under the state’s ownership.  As of 
spring 2019, among the fifty largest domestic commercial banks in China, 
 
Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-owned Banks in Emerging 
Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 454 (2005). 
 19. See generally Jacob Yaron, State-owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI): 
Background, Political Economy and Performance Assessment, at 10-14, http://www.iadb.org/ 
res/publications/pubfiles/pubs-492.pdf (2004). 
 20. Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 4-5. 
 21. World Bank Open Data, GDP – World & China, https://data.worldbank.org/indic 
ator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=1W-CN&start=2010 (last visited Aug. 18, 
2019). 
 22. For a comprehensive discussion of the CCP’s influence in China’s political regime, 
see RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 
(2010). To be sure, by using the term “party-state,” I do not suggest that CCP is a unitary 
party system which has only one voice from the top. CCP’s party system is complicated. The 
central party system contains different factions pursuing different values and interests. The 
central party system also possesses different horizons with the local party system, and the 
former cannot always discipline the latter. Each local party system also pursues different local 
interests and often competes with each other. For a discussion of how the different factions 
within the CCP affect China’s monetary policies, see VICTOR SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE 
IN CHINA: ELITE CONFLICT AND INFLATION (2008). 
 23. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: 
Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013); 
Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career 
Approach, 3 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013); Curtis J, Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, 
Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEORGETOWN L.J. 665 
(2015). See also BENJAMIN L. LIEBMAN & CURTIS J. MILHAUPT EDS., REGULATING THE VISIBLE 
HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (2015) [hereinafter 
REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND]. For a thorough introduction to the state capitalism around 
the world, see BREMMER, supra note 16. 
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only two do not have state controlling shareholders.24  Taken together, it 
appears that SBs do not compromise China’s economic development. 
China explains its relative success by a faction of conventional 
development economics which offers a development theory for SBs.  
According to this theory, when a state cannot create a friendly environment 
for private investment, direct state ownership of production can substitute.25  
Specifically, for countries where under-developed economic institutions 
hinder private banks from supporting economic growth, the state’s 
ownership of banks can fill the gap and improve the general welfare.26  This 
developmental account of SBs provides theoretical support for China’s 
repeated claims that the party’s leadership is necessary for developing 
China’s economy.27 
In this paper, I propose a relative theory to harmonize the property right 
theory and the development theory and account for the partial success and 
upcoming challenges of China’s SBs.  I argue that the success of China’s 
SBs might contain a temporal element, depending on the relative strength 
and weakness of private sectors vis-à-vis state sectors in developing China’s 
economy.  In the early development stage of an economy, the state sector 
perhaps mobilizes the development more efficiently.  Nevertheless, as an 
economy develops, the state’s relative advantage would gradually decline 
while its relative disadvantage becomes more prominent.  When the critical 
intersection arrives, reducing the state’s intervention and leaving more space 
to private sectors would become more efficient.  Hence, it is a matter of 
finding a balance between the state and private sectors.  China’s success by 
far might reflect efficient use of the state sector in its earlier phase of 
development, but this may be unsustainable.  At some point, China will need 
 
 24. They are China Minsheng Bank and Ping An Bank. 
 25. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State versus Private Ownership, 12:4 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 
(1998); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (World Bank, 1994). 
 26. After the Global Financial Crisis, academics also take note of the countercyclical 
role of SOBs. See generally Martin Cihak & Asli Demirguc- Kunt, Rethinking the State’s 
Role in Finance, 13-15 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. WPS 6400, 2013); 
Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 8-9. Ata Can Bertay et al., Bank Ownership and Credit over 
the Business Cycle: Is Lending by State Banks Less Procyclical? (World Bank Pol’y Res., 
Working Paper No. WPS 6110, 2012). 
 27. See, e.g., People’s Congress, Decision regarding the Outline of the Thirteenth Five-
Year Plan on National Economy and Social Development (第十二届全国人民代表大会第
四次会议关于国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要的决议), Chapter 2 (Mar. 16, 
2016); The Standing Committee of People’s Congress, Working Report (全国人民代表大会
常务委员会工作报告), para. 4(3) (Mar. 9, 2016). 
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to readjust the party-state’s role in the banking sector, and the U.S.-China 
trade war might trigger this point. 
To support the proposed relative theory, I employ a comparative method 
based on the experience of four East Asian economies.  Before China 
emerged, East Asia was the region of “economic miracles” which produced 
the most astonishing growth after World War II.28  Japan was the most 
prominent example, whose strong economic performance in the 1980s 
amazed the world at a similar level with current China.  Other than Japan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all delivered impressive 
economic performance during this period.29  More importantly, except for 
Hong Kong, these East Asian economies did not belong to the neoliberalist 
camp.30  Instead, they achieved economic success by adopting the 
unorthodox model of “developmental states” featuring a mix of market 
economy and heavy governmental intervention.31  The government’s control 
of finance is a particularly important element for it to exert influence over 
the investment pattern of their economies and guide sectoral mobility.32  The 
cases of these East Asian neighbors, similar to China, supported the 
development theory for SBs. 
Nevertheless, the later development of these East Asian developmental 
states also cautions against the sustainability of the SB model.  After the 
 
 28. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1993). 
 29. See infra Section III.B. 
 30. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 18-20. 
 31. See generally Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the 
Politics of Nationalism and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1 (Meredith Woo-
Comings ed., 1999); HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE: THE 
MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006). In an abstract, developmental states possess 
the following characteristics. First, there is an interventionist state that is neither socialist nor 
free-market, but a plan-rational capitalist developmental state conjoining private ownership 
with state guidance. Second, nationalism is a motivation, at least in East Asia’s practice, to 
the extent that these states face challenges from Western imperialism and use economic 
development to ensure their national survival. Third, the state partners with business sectors 
by formulating broad economic plans, identifying the means for implementing it and ensuring 
competition in designated strategic sectors. 
 32. Woo-Cumings, id. at 10-13. Other important elements include: First, the state is 
governed by a group of elite state bureaucracy which is capable and less captured by social 
interest groups. Second, the state develops the economy largely through industrial policies, 
under which the state designates specific sector for prioritized development, invests in capital 
to finance it and creates a friendly business environment to support it. Third, the state’s trade 
policies also help developing its economy, in particular through the protection of the infant 
industry and the promotion of export. Fourth, the state’s competition policy is managed in the 
sense that the state is concerned about excessive and destructive competition and thus 
deliberately creates an oligopolistic market structure to exploit scale economy. 
4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  2:38 PM 
268 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
splendid performance in the 1980s, they all experienced economic 
turbulence in the 1990s.  The government’s domination of the banking 
system was also under attack.  In response, all four economies more or less 
reduced the government’s intervention in banking systems in the 1990s and 
2000s.33  These instances evidence that even though the SB model may 
facilitate the initial development, it is difficult to sustain for good.34  Drawing 
lessons therefrom, China should not over-claim the relative success of its SB 
model, especially when it is about to proceed to the next level of 
development.  The recent slowdown of economic growth and the 
accelerating banking risks in China are sending the warning signal. 
That said, the experience of East Asian developmental states offers a 
variety of ways to reach state-private balance in the banking sector.  Each of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore adopted different approaches to 
transition toward a banking system that is less dominated by the government, 
which range from regulatory reforms, ownership privatization, market 
entries, to management professionalization.  Depending on its economic and 
political backgrounds, China can develop its SB reforms to pursue 
development while controlling the negatives of concern to property right 
theorists.  Specifically, privatization is not the only way forward: observers 
should not judge China’s reform efforts solely based on if it engages in 
ownership privatization.  
This paper can contribute to comparative finance and corporate 
governance literature in at least three aspects.  First, it analyzes the potential 
benefits and challenges of Chinese SBs, which facilitates a better 
understanding of China’s banking sector.  Second, it puts forward a 
perspective for observing the banking evolution in East Asia which features 
the developmental state model.  This lays down a theoretical framework for 
future envisagement of an East Asian financial theory.  Last but not least, it 
harmonizes the debate between the property right theory and the 
development theory by proposing the relative theory as a middle ground.  
This theoretical intervention offers a more balanced and accurate account of 
the pros and cons of the SB practice.   
I will structure this paper as follows.  In Section II, I will introduce the 
SB practice in China to exhibit the theoretical debate between the property 
right theory and the development theory under the current SB studies.  In 
 
 33. See infra Section IV.A. 
 34. Dani Rodrik offered an accurate observation of the developmental state model. While 
the unorthodox tools employed by the developmental states may help to reach growth in the 
infant stage of an economy, these tools might not be sustainable. To sustain growth, it requires 
more extensive institutional reform, such as independent judiciaries, stabilizing fiscal policy, 
political democracy, financial supervision, etc. In the end, the state’s intervention has to exit 
gradually to move the economy forward. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 13-55. 
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Section III, I put forward the first half of the relative theory to illustrate how 
SBs can promote economic development in the early stage of an economy 
by reviewing the SB practice of four East Asian economies in their early 
development phases.  In Section IV, I proceed to the second half of the 
relative theory to illustrate the challenges faced with by SBs as the economy 
develops, again, by reviewing the transition adopted by the four East Asian 
economies in the 1990s.  Section V is the conclusion.  Overall, the proposed 
relative theory cautions that the success of China’s SB model is perhaps 
unsustainable.  The Chinese party-state should learn from the Chinese 
classics and realize that a proud dragon, at some point, should repent. 
 
II.  State Ownership of Banks and the State Capitalist China 
 
State ownership of banks is a controversial topic.  Mainstream studies 
follow the property right theory and disfavor this practice.  In recent years, 
however, the revised property right theorists seem to provide a more 
balanced account for the SBs.  China’s emergence further revives the long-
forgotten development theory. 
 
A.  Contemporary Perception of State-Owned Banks 
1.  The Property Right Theory 
 
Mainstream literature, based on the property right theory, disfavors the 
SB practice.  Its rationale is simple: there is no guarantee that the government 
will benevolently and efficiently operate SBs.  According to it, SBs entail at 
least three major problems. 
First, SBs incur more serious agency problems.  According to the 
property right theory, since SBs are owned by the government which is 
essentially owned by all taxpayers, they have the most dispersed ownership 
structure that entails the most serious separation of ownership from control.35  
Government officials in charge of SBs are thus subject to less supervision 
and incur more serious agency problems.  They are also less capable of 
operating banks well because they typically have little business experience 
in banking.  Therefore, SBs are inherently less efficient than private banks.36 
 
 35. See generally Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 II POLITICO 
816 (1965). For a summary of the agency problems intensified in GOBs, see Dinc, supra note 
18, at 454. 
 36. See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?, 
13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 205, 240 and 245 (2004); Alejandro Micco et al., Bank Ownership 
and Performance: Does Politics Matter?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 219 (2007). 
4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  2:38 PM 
270 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
Second, SBs incur political intervention.  SBs are owned by the 
government which is operated and supervised by politicians, thus their 
activities are subject to politicians’ influence.  Since politicians typically care 
their interests, they will influence SBs to serve their interests instead of 
public ones.37  For instance, it is empirically found that SBs tend to increase 
loans in election years, which is a product of the political intervention.38  
These political loans typically lack solid credit support and thus may easily 
become nonperforming and harm the safety and soundness of SBs.  By 
extending loans to political cronies instead of productive projects, SBs also 
fail to invest their funds efficiently, resulting in financial repression in other 
productive sectors.39 
Third, SBs also involve regulatory and competitive concerns.  The 
government is both the regulator and owner of SBs and thus has conflicting 
interests that prevent it from providing a level playing field for all banks.  
For instance, to secure SBs’ market power, the regulator might refuse private 
or foreign entry in the banking market, which leads to a less competitive 
banking market.  In exercising its regulatory power, the government may 
also treat SBs nicer than private banks, resulting in regulatory forbearance 
and unfair advantage in favor of SBs.40  These would all negatively affect 
the financial development of an economy. 
Based on the above, the property right theorists argue that the potential 
advantages of SBs tend to be an illusion.41  Mainstream empirical studies 
also appear to support the property right theory.  The most influential piece 
came from La Porta et al. in 2002: based on data of SBs from 92 countries, 
they found that state ownership of banks in 1970 was associated with slower 
 
 37. See generally Jacob Yaron, State-owned Development Finance Institutions (SDFI): 
Background, Political Economy and Performance Assessment, at 10-14, http://www.iadb.org/ 
res/publications/pubfiles/pubs-492.pdf (2004). 
 38. See, e.g., Giuliano Iannotta et al., The Impact of Government Ownership on Bank 
Risk, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 152 (2013); Dinc, supra note 18; Paola Sapienza, The Effects 
of Government Ownership on Bank Lending, 72:2 J. FIN. ECON. 357 (2004). 
 39. See, e.g., Rainer Haselmann et al., Real Effects of Bank Governance: Bank 
Ownership and Corporate Innovation (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. DP7488, 2009). 
 40. Gutierrez et al., supra note 11, at 4-5. 
 41. For a further analysis of how the corporate governance weakness of SOBs appears 
in practice, see David H. Scott, Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-
Owned Financial Institutions, 3-4 (The World Bank, Fin. & Private Sector Dev., Fin. Systems 
Dep’t, Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. WPS4321, 2007). 
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subsequent financial development and lower subsequent growth in per capita 
income.42  Other studies during that period also reached similar findings.43 
 
a.The Revised Property Right Theory 
 
Recent literature, however, perceives SBs less negatively.  According 
to the updated findings which I term as the “revised property right theory,” 
the negatives of SBs as enumerated above can be controlled by some 
institutions of an economy.  For instance, a competitive financial market can 
motivate government officials to run SBs efficiently because being 
outperformed by other banks might hurt their reputation and hinder their 
future promotion.44  A transparent and uncorrupted political system can 
prevent government officials from tunneling the bank asset for political 
purpose and thus secure the operational efficiency of SBs.45  According to 
the revised property right theory, the effects of SBs depend on the institutions 
of an economy, and developed economies tend to possess necessary 
institutions to control the negatives of SBs. 
Several empirical studies lend support to this perspective.  For instance, 
Rafael La Porta et al. themselves found that the negative effects of SBs were 
more significant in financially underdeveloped economies or economies 
with poor protection of property rights.46  Marcia Million Cornett et al. found 
that SBs in East Asia performed more poorly than private banks in 1997 to 
2000 (i.e., during the Asian Financial Crisis) but no longer the case in 2001-
 
 42. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57:1 J. FIN. 265, 266 (2002). 
 43. See, e.g., Gerard Caprio & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Avoiding Disasters: 
Policies to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crises, 25 (World Bank mimeo & Egyptian Center for 
Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 47, 2000); James R. Barth et al., Banking Systems Around 
the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?, 27 (The World 
Bank Dev. Res. Group, Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2325, 2000). 
 44. Douglas W. Caves and Laurits R. Christensen, who compare the performance of 
government-owned Canadian railroads and private railroads in a competitive environment, 
find that both perform equally well. They explain this finding by arguing that market 
competition may have the ability to overcome inefficiency resulted from government 
ownership. Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency of Public 
and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian Railroad, 88:5 J. 
POL. ECON. 958, 958 (1980). Other literature also finds that government-owned firms may be 
as efficient as private firms in competitive environments, provided that there is sufficient 
competition between these two firms and that the government does not provide discriminative 
regulations and subsidies in favor of government-owned ones. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, 
Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the 
Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1989). 
 45. Tobias Korner & Isabel Schnabel, Public Ownership of Banks and Economic 
Growth: The Impact of Country Heterogeneity, 19(3) ECON. OF TRANSITION 407, 435 (2011). 
 46. La Porta et al., supra note 42, at 290. 
4 - Yang_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  2:38 PM 
272 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
2004 (i.e. after the crisis).  They interpret this change as consistent with a 
life-cycle model, under which financial globalization brought about 
competition and thus pressured SBs to improve their banking policy.47  
Tobias Korner and Isabel Schnabel found that the negative effects of SBs 
found by La Porta et al. vanished in economies with highly developed 
financial systems and advanced political institutions.48  At even higher levels 
of financial development, the effect of SBs even became positive and large.49  
These findings suggest that the potential negatives of SBs are controllable. 
 
B.  The State Capitalist China and Its Party-State-Dominated Banking 
Sector 
 
Neither the property right theory nor the revised property right theory 
can explain China.  China is one of the most successful economies in the 
world.  At the same time, it maintains a banking system that is highly 
dominated by the party-state and claims that this system results in its 
economic success. 
 
a.  An Overview of China’s Economy and Banking 
 
Today, no one would ever underestimate the economic power of China.  
After four decades of super growth, China’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) 
has skyrocketed to US$13.61 trillion as of 2018, which accounted for 15.86 
percent of the world GDP.50  What makes China’s economic success even 
more miraculous is its speed and constancy.  In 1978, China’s GDP was only 
US$ 147 billion, ranking tenth among world economies.51  This represents 
more than 92 times of GDP growth in forty years.  Moreover, China has 
maintained this rate of growth in a steady manner.  Except for 1989 and 1990, 
for forty years China managed to maintain its GDP growth rate at above 5 
 
 47. Marcia Million Cornett et al., The Impact of State Ownership on Performance 
Differences in Privately-owned versus State-owned Banks: An International Comparison, 19 
J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 74 (2010). 
 48. See generally Korner & Schnabel, supra note 45. See also Svetlana Andrianova et 
al., Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions and Economic Growth, 79 ECONOMICA 449 
(2012). 
 49. Korner & Schnabel, supra note 45, at 420-21. 
 50. World Bank Open Data, GDP – China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=CN-1W&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 51. Classora Knowledge Base, Ranking of the World’s Richest Countries by GDP 
(1975), http://en.classora.com/reports/t24369/general/ranking-of-the-worlds-richest-countr 
ies-by-gdp?edition=1978&fields= (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
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percent.52  This speedy and steady growth unsurprisingly made China a 
successful case from which other developing countries are eager to derive 
lessons. 
In the course of China’s economic growth, its commercial banks played 
an extremely crucial role.  China’s banking sector is the major funder of its 
economy.53  In 2018, China’s bank credits equaled for 161 percent of China’s 
GDP, while in the United States this figure was only 52 percent.54  In contrast, 
the market capitalization of listed domestic companies equaled for only 46 
percent of China’s GDP, while in the United States this figure was 149 
percent.55  As of June 2019, China’s non-financial sectors received RMB 213 
trillion of finance from the financial sector, of which loans accounted for 
78.2 percent, corporate bonds accounted for 9.9 percent, and stock accounted 
for only 3.3 percent respectively.56  Consequently, unlike the United States 
where economic activities obtain funds mainly from capital markets, China’s 
economy heavily relies on banks.57 
China’s banking sector started to develop since the reform and openness 
in 1978.58  At the end of 2018, the total assets of Chinese commercial banks 
had reached RMB 203.41 trillion.59  This giant banking sector is comprised 
of four main types of banks: state-owned commercial banks (“SOCBs”, with 
 
 52. World Bank Open Data, GDP Growth – China, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 53. For an overview of China’s overall financial system, see Franklin Allen et al., 
China’s Financial System: Growth and Risk, 9:3-4 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS® IN FINANCE 
197 (2015). 
 54. World Bank Open Data, Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks – US & China, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=CN-US (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2019). 
 55. World Bank Open Data, Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies – US 
& China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=CN-US 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 56. PBOC, The Statistics Report of the Scale of Social Finance Stock as of June 2019 
(2019年6月社会融资规模存量统计数据报告) (July 12, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/ 
2019-07/12/content_5408834.htm. 
 57. To be fair, China is not exceptional in this. Many advanced countries, such as Japan 
and Australia, adopt this bank-based model as well. In Japan, bank credits equaled for 108 
percent of Japan’s GDP in 2018; in 1998, this figure used to skyrocket to 196 percent. In 
Australia, this figure was 140 percent in 2018. World Bank Open Data, Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector by Banks – Japan & Australia, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FD.A 
ST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=JP-AU (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 58. For a comprehensive introduction to the banking evolution in China, see LI ZHI-HUI, 
DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM OF CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM 12-17 (2012). 
 59. CBIRC, http://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/C990691733D644B39582D 
EFA3EF1EF69.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
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46 percent market share by asset),60 joint-stock commercial banks (“JSCBs,” 
with 23 percent market share),61 city commercial banks (“CCBs,” with 17 
percent market share),62 and rural financial institutions (including rural 
commercial banks “RCBs”63 and other rural banking institutions, together 
with 17 percent market share). 
 
b.The Corporate Governance Model of China’s SBs 
 
While there is an increasing amount of studies on China’s state 
capitalism and its implication with corporate governance, they mostly focus 
on Chinese SOEs.64  Relatively fewer studies concentrated on the corporate 
governance of Chinese SBs,65 the major financier of China’s state capitalism.  
To fill this gap, in a separate paper, I conduct a comprehensive analysis of 
the corporate governance practice of Chinese SBs.66  Below I briefly 
summarize these findings to give an overview of how China’s state 
capitalism manifests in the banking sector. 
The Chinese party-state dominates China’s banking sector in at least 
three aspects.  First, it is the ultimate owner of China’s banking sector.  Most 
major Chinese banks are under the state’s ownership.  Through the Central 
 
 60. SOCBs are the largest type of commercial banks in China. The majority of their 
shares are owned by the central government via either the Central Huijin Investment Company 
(“Central Huijin”) or the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”). 
 61. JSCBs are the national commercial banks that are not the SOCBs. The CCP approved 
their incorporation mostly during the late 1980s or 1990s to introduce market competition in 
the national banking market. They are mostly owned by SOEs or local governments. 
 62. CCBs refer to commercial banks incorporated based on city credit cooperatives. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, to develop the local economy, the Chinese government permitted the 
incorporation of city credit cooperatives to supply the finance. As these cooperatives exposed 
to heightened risks in the 1990s, the Chinese government approved their restructuring into 
CCBs to weather the local financial crisis. Most CCBs are owned and controlled by local 
governments and the associated local party system. 
 63. RCBs refer to local commercial banks which are required to extend a certain portion 
of their loans to local peasants, agriculture, and economic development of rural villages. 
CBRC, TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ON ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (农
村商业银行管理暂行规定), arts. 2 & 46 (Ch.). Most RCBs are owned and controlled by 
local governments and their associated local party systems. 
 64. See e.g., Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 23; Lin, supra note 23; Milhaupt & Zheng, 
supra note 23. 
 65. For the literature specifically addressing the corporate governance of Chinese SBs, 
see Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura 
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS: CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Zhu Min et al., eds., 2009); Yang, 
Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons, supra note 6. 
 66. See Yang, id. at 9-31. 
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Huijin Investment Company (“Central Huijin”) and the Ministry of Finance 
(“MOF”), the Chinese party-state holds majority ownership of all five 
SOCBs.  Through the central government, local governments, or SOEs, the 
Chinese party-state also owns ten of the twelve JSCBs which are the second-
tier national banks as mentioned above.67  This ownership structure is unlike 
the government ownership of banks in the United States during the Global 
Financial Crisis.  Although the U.S. Treasury held extensive ownership of 
707 financial institutions during that period, most of its holdings were 
minority holdings and meant to be temporary.68  Instead, the Chinese party-
state holds controlling stakes in Chinese banks on a long-term basis. 
Second, the Chinese party-state is the human resource headquarter of 
China’s banking sector.  Instead of passively owning banks, it actively 
engages in the personnel decisions of banks through CCP’s party system.  In 
most cases, regardless of the ownership structure of a bank, CCP effectively 
controls the appointment of its executive team, such as the board’s 
chairperson, the supervisory board’s chairperson, the chief executive officer 
(“CEO”), vice presidents, and other important positions.69  For banks at the 
central level, this appointment power lies in either the Central Organization 
Committee or the CBIRC.70  For banks at local levels, such power lies in the 
organization departments of the local party system in charge of the region.71  
Most senior managers at Chinese commercial banks bear party ranking and 
are thus subject to CCP’s promotion system, rotation of jobs, and discipline 
of misbehaviors.72  By exercising this appointment power, CCP ensures that 
the executive teams of Chinese commercial banks serve the state’s policies 
and the party’s interests. 
 
 67. As of 2019, only the China Minsheng Bank and Ping An Bank were not owned by a 
state controlling shareholder. 
 68. Except for the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American Insurance Group, and Citi 
Group, the U.S. Treasury only held minimal ownership of the bailed-out financial institutions. 
For more detailed summaries of these bailout investments, see Steven M. Davidoff, 
Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1733 1736-56 (2011). See also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, 
Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61:3 ADMIN. L. REV. 
463 (2009). 
 69. LIU PENG (刘鹏), ZHONGGUO SHANGYE YINHANG BIANGE YU ZHUANXING: JINJI 
SHICHANGHUA ZHONG SHANGYE YIHANG DE ZUOYONG YU KECHIXU FAJAN (中国商业银行
变革与转型：经济市场化中商业银行的作用与可持续发展) 170 (THE REFORM AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS: THE ROLE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN PROCESS OF ECONOMIC MARKETIZATION) (2014). 
 70. Sebastian Heilmann, Regulatory Innovation by Leninist Means: Communist Party 
Supervision in China’s Financial Industry, CHINA Q. 1, 17-18 (2005). 
 71. LIU, supra note 69, at 170. 
 72. Id. 
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Third, the Chinese party-state is a crucial customer to Chinese banks.  
It is reported that only one-third of bank loans flowed to private sectors,73 
which suggests the public sector’s capture of Chinese banks.  Moreover, the 
Chinese party-state fiscally backs the public sector and thus implicitly 
guarantees public borrowings, which makes loans to public sectors safer than 
those to private sectors.74  In this context, the preferential lending in favor of 
the public sector in China75 is not necessarily the product of state intervention 
but rather banks’ own rational decision. 
Through the above ties, coupled with its inherent regulatory power, the 
Chinese party-state tightly controls Chinese commercial banks.  This allows 
the party-state to mobilize domestic investible funds toward targeted sectors 
to implement its economic plans, which is a crucial element of Chinese state 
capitalism.76  To be fair, this development model is not unprecedented.  As 
will be discussed later in detail, many East Asian economies, including 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, adopted similar models known 
as “the developmental state” in the 1980s to pursue development and 
growth.77  The hand of the Chinese party-state, however, stretches farther and 
deeper. 
 
c.  Summary: The China Puzzle 
 
China’s prevalent use of SBs and its tremendous economic success 
poses a puzzle to contemporary SB studies.  If the property right theory is 
correct, China’s widespread use of SBs should result in serious financial and 
economic underdevelopment.  That did not happen in China.  
Notwithstanding the economic turbulence in the late 1990s and early 
 
 73. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES IN 
CHINA 99-112 (2014).  
 74. Evan Oxhorn, Consumer Finance and Financial Repression in China, 7 U. PENN 
EAST ASIA L. REV. 397, 410-11 (2012). 
 75. Some estimated that SOEs could have easy access to loans at a third of the market 
interest rate. Shaun Breslin, Financial Transitions in the PRC: Banking on the State?, 35:6 
THIRD WORLD Q. 996, 1003 (2014). 
 76. BREMMER, supra note 16, at 134-35. 
 77. For an overview of the development model of East Asian developmental states, see 
WOO-COMINGS, MEREDITH ED., THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1999). For a discussion of how 
such developmental model affects the corporate governance practice in East Asia, see Yueh-
Ping (Alex) Yang, Envisaging an East Asian Model of Corporate Governance: A 
Developmental State Perspective, in LEGAL THOUGHTS BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST IN 
THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER: A LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HERBERT 
HAN-PAO MA 445 (Chang-Fa Lo et al. eds., 2016). 
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2000s,78 the party-state’s domination of the banking sector has not brought 
devastating results to China’s finance and economy.  To the contrary, China’s 
economy outperformed many other large economies which adopted more 
market-oriented reforms.79 
The revised property right theory cannot explain the China puzzle as 
well.  According to the revised property right theory, only in developed 
economies with advanced financial and political institutions can SBs 
function well.  China, however, does not fall into this category.  It remains a 
developing country.  Its legal and political institutions are never satisfactory 
according to the global standard.  Its financial institutions, such as market 
competition and banking professionals, are catching up, but they can hardly 
be characterized as advanced.  Their business model remains traditional, 
which relies heavily on interest-bearing activities such as loans: by the end 
of 2018, non-interest revenue only accounted for 22.1 percent of the overall 
revenue of Chinese banks.80  The relative success of Chinese SBs does not 
seem to arise from robust institutions which discipline the party-state’s 
operation of SBs. 
 
III.  China is “not Alone but Has Its Neighbors” 
 
The Chinese party-state tells a different story to explain the success of 
China’s SBs by advocating that the party-state’s leadership are indispensable 
for China’s development.81  On this developmental account, China is “not 
alone but has its neighbors.”  The experience of East Asian developmental 
states echoes this development theory. 
 
A.  An Overview of East Asian Developmental States 
 
Before China emerged, East Asia was the region of “economic 
miracles” which produced the most astonishing growth after World War II.  
Japan was the most prominent one, whose strong economic performance in 
the 1980s amazed the world at a similar level with current China.  Other than 
 
 78. For a comprehensive discussion of the local banking crisis in China during this 
period, see CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL 
FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2011). 
 79. DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 14 (2007). 
 80. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal 
Persons) (2018) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2018年)) (Feb. 25, 2019), http:// 
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/3954F0B0DF6C47F2AB36C1085791F448.html. 
 81. See supra note 27. 
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Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all delivered 
impressive economic performance during this period.  More importantly, 
except for Hong Kong, these East Asian economies did not belong to the 
neoliberalist camp.82  Instead, they achieved economic success by adopting 
the unorthodox model of “developmental states” featuring a mix of market 
economy and heavy governmental intervention.83   
Developmental states utilize the relative efficiency of the government 
versus the market.  Summarizing the experience of Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, studies highlighted that developmental states 
featured the government’s role in the economy.84  They argued that, for 
latecomer economies whose private institutions are too underdeveloped to 
kick-start economic development, a development-minded government may 
be better positioned than the market to ignite development.  Such 
government can accumulate limited investible capital, pick and choose the 
industrial sectors for prioritized development, and allocate capital to them to 
create a “big push” for the economy.85  Under this theory, the government’s 
control of finance is particularly important for it to influence the investment 
pattern of the economy and guide sectoral mobility.  At least from a 
consequentialist perspective, the economic success of East Asia 
demonstrates the practical merits of the developmental state model.86 
 
B.  Banking Systems in East Asian Developmental States 
 
The heavy hand of a plan-rational developmental state particularly 
presides in the banking sector.  After all, finance is “the nerve of the 
 
 82. RODRIK, supra note 79, at 18-20. 
 83. See generally Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the 
Politics of Nationalism and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 1 (Meredith Woo-
Comings ed., 1999); HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE: THE 
MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006).  
 84. Id. In an abstract, developmental states possess the following characteristics. First, 
there is an interventionist government that is neither socialist nor free-market, but a plan-
rational capitalist developmental state conjoining private ownership with state guidance. 
Second, nationalism is a motivation, at least in East Asia’s practice, to the extent that these 
economies face challenges from Western imperialism and use economic development to 
ensure their national survival. Third, the government partners with business sectors by 
formulating broad economic plans, identifying the means for implementing it and ensuring 
competition in designated strategic sectors. 
 85. For a more in-depth discussion of the rationale behind East Asian developmental 
states, see CHANG, supra note 31, at 109-133, 227-256. 
 86. Chang comprehensively studied how the initial conditions in East Asia before the 
1960s lagged behind those in Sub-Saharan Africa, which shows that East Asia’s economic 
success was not based on initial conditions. Id. at 143-175. 
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developmental state.”87  Below I consult the experiences of four main East 
Asian economies, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, to 
illustrate how they controlled their banks. 
1.  Japan: A Government-Directed Banking System 
Among the East Asian developmental states, Japan was the leading 
pioneer.88  Throughout the 1960s to 1980s, Japan achieved marvelous 
economic growth, which brought it from ashes and ruins after World War II 
to the third-largest economy in the world now.  Its economic growth was 
miraculously rapid since the 1960s89 and continued until 1990.  From 1960 
to 1990, Japan’s GDP grew from US$44.3 billion to US$3.1 trillion,90 which 
is equal to 70 times growth.  Japan’s emergence shocked the global economy 
and attracted many studies of the secret behind Japan’s economic success.91  
Japan’s economic model during this period is nonetheless unorthodox.  
Observers identified several key characteristics leading to Japan’s economic 
success, such as the well-known main bank system, keiretsu, lifetime 
employment, etc.92  This special bank-business-labor relationship reached a 
 
 87. Woo-Cumings, supra note 31, at 10. 
 88. Chalmers Johnson provided a pioneer study of the Japanese developmental state in 
1982, which commenced the studies of East Asian developmental states. See generally 
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982). 
 89. In 1961, Japan’s GDP growth was 12.04 percent, which commenced its golden eras. 
 90. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Japan, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1990&locations=JP&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 91. Earlier studies produced different schools of thoughts on the success of Japan’s 
economy, including the “national character-basic values-consensus” view highlighting the 
cultural difference, the “no-miracle-occurred” view highlighting the contribution from free 
market and private sectors, the “unique-structural-features” view highlighting several unusual 
Japanese institutions, the “free-ride” view highlighting the beneficiary of Japan’s postwar 
alliance with the United States, and the “developmental state” view. For the summary, see 
JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 7-19. 
 92. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 
28:1 J. ECON. LITERATURES 1 (1990). In brief, after World War II, capital markets in Japan, 
which used to be robust before the war, stagnated and never revived since then, rendering 
Japan a bank-led economy. Since large private banks were the major source of funds for 
enterprises, they became the center supporting finance to a group of businesses, supervising 
their financial performance and taking the necessary intervention on the board when financial 
conditions deteriorate (the main bank system). Businesses also grouped with and depended 
on each other, cross-holding the shares of each other, which established strong business ties 
among each other (the keiretsu system). Businesses, in turn, guaranteed their employees the 
lifetime employment, which incentivized the on-the-job training of employees and the 
development of their company-specific skills (the lifetime employment system). For 
arguments claiming that these characteristics were all urban legends, contra YOSHIRO MIWA 
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fine balance during this period and contributed to Japan’s economic success.  
Most importantly, Japan did not achieve success by merely adopting free-
market prescriptions.  The Japanese government, in particular, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”), played an arguably leading 
role.93  Its influence in the banking system was, in particular, a key to 
pursuing its industrial policies.   
Japan’s banking system during the 1960s to the 1990s featured a two-
tier system.  The first tier was the private banking sector, comprised of city 
banks, regional banks, cooperatives, trust banks, etc., which provided short-
term credits,94 as well as the long-term credit banks providing long-term 
credits.95  The second tier was the government banks, including the Japan 
Development Bank (“JDB”) and Export-Import Bank, which provided long-
term loans to large firms in strategic industries, and the Japan Finance 
Corporation for Small Business and People’s Finance Corporation which 
provided loans to small firms.  They were all wholly owned by the Japanese 
government.  Most importantly, they were backed by Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, which attracted postal savings (a form of deposits) 
from public savers and funded these government banks according to the 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan (“FILP”) co-managed by the Ministry of 
Finance and MITI.96 
The Japanese government dominated or at least guided Japan’s banking 
system.  On the one hand, it guided government banks to channel their funds 
to serve policy purposes.  MITI played an influential role here.  Taking JDB 
for instance, although it decided its credit allocation independently from the 
government in principle, in practice, MITI actively “recommended” JDB to 
 
& J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE 
ECONOMY 61-88 (2006). 
 93. MITI’s tools included control over foreign exchange, imports of technology, 
preferential financing, tax breaks and protection from competition, which allowed it to select 
industries for nurturing and regulated cut-throat competition. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 199. 
Such intervention, in particular, the industrial policies, played a crucial role in the success of 
Japan’s economy during this period. Johnson offered a comprehensive analysis of the MITI’s 
role in Japan’s industrial policies. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 88. 
 94. The six main banks in Japan in that period were Fuji, Sanwa, Daiichi, Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo banks. 
 95. The three major long-term credit banks were the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Long-
Term Credit Bank of Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank. 
 96. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 210. While the FILP funding provided enormous funds 
to support government policies, it was separated from the government budget and was thus 
subject to less scrutiny of the Diet (i.e., the Congress in Japan). JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 
211 (reporting that “from 1953 on FILP had always been from a third to half of the size of the 
general account budget and had ranged from a low of 3.3 percent (1956) to a high of 6.3 
percent (1972) of GNP”). 
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lend to individual firms97 through its power to screen all loan applications 
and placement of its retired senior officials on JDB’s board.98  Although 
government lending institutions only accounted for no more than 20 percent 
of all bank loans in Japan,99 their loans bear indicative effect for private 
banks.100   
On the other hand, in respect of the larger part of Japan’s banking 
system, i.e. private banks, the Japanese government also possessed some 
leverage.  Although it did not own and control these banks, it arguably 
employed several tools to direct their support of the government’s industrial 
policies.  The famous one was the directed loans through “administrative 
guidance.”101  During the high-growth period, Bank of Japan (“BOJ”), 
Japan’s central bank, controlled bank credits through the so-called “window 
guidance” practice, which not only implemented BOJ’s monetary policy102 
but also supported the allocation of resources.  To do it, BOJ had regular 
meetings with private banks, during which it instructed their lending plans.  
Private banks, in turn, prepared their lending plans broke down by sectors, 
the size of borrowers, and use of funds and sent to BOJ for approval.  In 
 
 97. Akiyoshi Horiuchi & Qing-Yuan Shi, Influence of the Japan Development Bank 
Loans on Corporate Investment Behavior, 7 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 441, 447 (1993). 
 98. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 209-10. 
 99. Richard A. Werner, A Reconsideration of the Rationale for Bank-Centered Economic 
Systems and the Effectiveness of Directed Credit Policies in the Light of Japanese Evidence, 
30:3 JAPANESE ECON. 3, 7 (2002). For a detailed summary, see Masami Imai, Political 
Determinants of Government Loans in Japan, 52:1 J.L. & ECON. 41, 45 (2009). 
 100. Although the scale of loans of government banks was low relative to that of private 
city banks, their loans implied the government’s support of the borrowers, which could 
comfort private banks’ concerns. For instance, JDB loans, flowing mostly to MITI’s 
designated strategic industries, were perceived the “MITI’s seal of approval” on an enterprise, 
which had an “information effect” that indicated a desirable direction of credit expansion. 
JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 211 (reporting that during 1953-55, 83 percent of JDB loan went 
to four strategic industries designated by MITI: electric power, ships, coal, and steel.) For the 
empirical evidence of the information effect of JDB loans, see Horiuchi & Sui, supra note 97. 
 101. Some academics considered Japan as the first country which employed directed loans 
successfully. Werner, supra note 99, at 8. For an introduction to the evolution of directed 
loans in Japan, see Werner, supra note 99, at 20-27. 
 102. For discussion of the monetary function of window guidance in Japan, see generally 
Takeo Hoshi et al., Japanese Corporate Investment and Bank of Japan Guidance of 
Commercial Bank Lending, in JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY 63 (Kenneth Singleton ed., 
1993); James R. Rhodes & Naoyuki Yoshino, Window Guidance by the Bank of Japan: Was 
Lending Controlled?, 17:2 CONTEMPORARY ECON. POL’Y 166 (1999); Tomoyuki Fukumoto 
et al., Effectiveness of Window Guidance and Financial Environment – in Light of Japan’s 
Experience of Financial Liberalization and a Bubble Economy, BANK OF JAPAN REV. 1 (Aug. 
2010). 
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essence, BOJ’s approval was merely an administrative guidance103 that was 
not legally binding.  BOJ, however, possessed several regulatory powers to 
ask for banks’ cooperation, such as the power to cut rediscount quotas, 
reduce window guidance quotas, or apply unfavorable terms to banks’ 
transactions with BOJ.104  Fearing regulatory retaliation, Japanese banks 
tended to follow BOJ’s direction.105  Therefore, the Japanese government 
could direct the loans of private banks to industries prioritized by the 
government even though it did not own or control private banks.106 
 
 103. Administrative guidance refers to the authority of the government to issue directives, 
requests, warnings, suggestions, and encouragements to the enterprises within a particular 
ministry’s jurisdiction. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 265. Administrative guidance became 
more salient since the 1960s because MITI lost its power to manage foreign exchange budget 
then because it failed to enact the Special Measures Law to continue its control power 
statutorily. For a thorough discussion of administrative guidance in Japan’s early development 
era, see JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 242-74. For a different view arguing that administrative 
guidance never really worked in Japan, see YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE 
OF THE KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 115-46 (2006). 
 104. On the other hand, several implicit governmental protection also allowed the 
Japanese government to provide carrots to private banks and ask for their cooperation. For 
instance, through rationing the financial market, the Japanese government made banks the 
major financiers in the economy, which in turn ensured their business opportunity. The 
Ministry of Finance also controlled lending and deposit rates, which guaranteed the minimum 
profits of bank loans. BOJ also supplied finance to private banks and thus implicitly 
guaranteed their loans, which relieved the financial risks of private banks. Last but not the 
least, the Japanese government, in general, controlled the competition in the banking market 
by restricting financial products, controlling the incorporation of branches, and limiting 
foreign entry, etc., so that banks would not engage in excessive competition that undermined 
their profit margins. It was reported that the total BOJ lending to commercial banks and other 
financial institutions for preferential credits to strategic industries amounted to 10 percent of 
the total money supply (M2) in the early 1950s. Yoon Je Cho & Thomas Hellmann, The 
Government’s Role in Japanese and Korean Credit Markets: A New Institutional Economics 
Perspective, at 11 (World Bank Policy Res. Working Paper, No. WPS-1190, 1993). Thanks 
to all these regulatory protections, private banks could concentrate on expanding their share 
of loans. In return, they were requested to enter in each new industry fostered by MITI, 
resulting in the so-called “one set-ism” phenomenon, that is, each bank keiretsu, in the end, 
possessed “a full complement of companies covering all the government-designated growth 
industries, regardless of whether it made business sense to do so.” JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 
206. 
 105. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 266. See also Werner, supra note 99, at 8. For a detailed 
discussion of the administrative guidance in Japan, see Allan D. Smith, The Japanese Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Labyrinth and 
the Castle, 16 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS 417, 424-33 (1984).  
 106. This formulated an industrial system characterized by the “pattern of dependence.” 
As illustrated by Chalmers Johnson, under this pattern, a group of enterprises borrowed from 
a major private bank in an amount exceeding their capacity to repay, which might stand for 
about 70 percent-80 percent of their operational capital. The bank, in turn, over-borrowed 
from BOJ. Through this system, BOJ obtained control over the policies and lending decisions 
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To be sure, academics are still debating whether the Japanese 
government exercised such influence effectively.  For one thing, different 
departments within the Japanese government had different policy horizons, 
which incurred coordination problems.  MITI might be the most 
development-minded department, but its influence over banks was rather 
limited, while the Ministry of Finance and BOJ might have more effective 
tools, but their horizons were more soundness-oriented than development-
oriented.107  Besides, private enterprises might have initiated the 
development plan first while the Japanese government simply followed suit 
strategically.108  Accordingly, whether and to what degree did the Japanese 
government guide domestic finance for development purpose, and lead to 
Japan’s economic success remain controversial among academics.  That 
said, it is fair to say that Japan maintained a government-directed banking 
system bearing similar nature with China’s banking system at least in many 
regulatory aspects, such as window guidance, directed loans, interest rate 
control, implicit government guarantee, limited foreign entry, etc. 
 
a.   South Korea: A Government-Owned Banking System 
 
South Korea is another East Asian developmental state which achieved 
tremendous economic growth during this period.109  From 1960 to 1995, the 
GDP of South Korea grew from US$3.9 billion to US$559.3 billion,110 which 
was equal to 143 times growth.  Except for 1962 and 1980, in these 35 years, 
South Korea managed to maintain at least 5 percent annual GDP growth rate.  
 
of private banks. The private banks, in turn, could dominate their borrowing enterprises, 
formulating the famous bank keiretsu system in Japan. JOHNSON, supra note 88, at 203-05. 
In the 1980s, however, when financial liberalization and deregulation rose in Japan, the 
Japanese government found it more difficult to implement its administrative guidance. For 
instance, the BOJ’s window guidance received less compliance in the 1980s, which eventually 
led to the demise of this practice in 1991. See generally Rhodes & Yoshino, supra note 102. 
 107. Johnson, for instance, argued that MITI, as the planner of industrial policy was the 
pilot agency in then Japan and the center that exerted the greatest positive influence. JOHNSON, 
supra note 88, at 26. In contrast, Calder provided a comprehensive account of how different 
agencies in Japan had difficulty in coordinating Japan’s financial policies. See generally KENT 
E. CALDER, STRATEGIC CAPITALISM: PRIVATE BUSINESS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN JAPANESE 
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE (1993). 
 108. See CALDER, id. at 108-12. 
 109. Alice H. Amsden provided the first comprehensive analysis of the developmental 
state model in South Korea, which was the pioneer study that was specific to South Korea. 
See generally ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1992). See also JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND FINANCE 
IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991); HA-JOON CHANG, supra note 31. 
 110. World Bank Open Data, GDP – South Korea, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1995&locations=KR&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
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Large conglomerates known as “chaebols”111 emerged: in 1986, South Korea 
had ten firms listed in Fortune 500 international private non‐oil-producing 
firms, while there were only seven from all other developing countries 
combined.112  In 1990, South Korea was the fifteenth largest economy in the 
world by GDP. 
The economic model of South Korea during this high-growth period 
had two primary characteristics: a strong and interventionist government as 
well as large diversified business groups (i.e., chaebols),113 which formed a 
reciprocal relationship.  Due to the colonial history and the authoritarian 
ruling, strong financiers, large businesses, or land-owners that could oppose 
to the government were absent in post-war South Korea, which resulted in a 
strong government.114  To maintain national security and to ensure its ruling, 
however, the government wanted industrialization, in particular, the 
economies of scale that could increase South Korea’s industrial 
competitiveness.  To achieve it, the government picked and chose targeted 
firms and industries, supplied cheap finance to subsidize them, forced them 
to build industries and engage in more exportation, and threatened them to 
withdraw the support if they failed.115  It also artificially underpriced 
domestic interest rates to encourage investment and undervalued exchange 
rates to promote exportation.  In return for the government’s favor, chaebols 
endeavored in expanding their exportation, businesses, employment, etc., to 
meet the government’s industrial plans.116  In this relationship, the 
government was autonomous of private sectors to the extent that it pursued 
goals independent of various industrial groups (such as security or industrial 
transformation), but it did so in ways that favored large businesses.117 
Under this economic model, a credit-based financial system mediated 
by an interventionist authoritarian government became the basis of the 
“Korea Inc.”118  The South Korean government possessed two primary tools 
for controlling finance: the power to price financial products and the 
 
 111. Chaebol refers to family-owned and -managed groups of companies that exercise 
monopolistic and oligopolistic control in product lines and industries. They are similar to 
keiretsu in Japan, except that they do not own banking institution at their core. Instead, the 
government mediates the flow of capital (including domestic and foreign ones) to the chaebol 
through a “designated bank.” WOO, supra note 109, at 149-50. 
 112. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 9. 
 113. Other features of South Korea’s economic model included an abundant supply of 
competent salaried engineers and low‐cost yet well‐educated labor. Id. at 8-11. 
 114. Id. at 147. 
 115. WOO, supra note 109, at 191-92. 
 116. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 146. 
 117. WOO, supra note 109, at 14. 
 118. Id. at 149. 
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ownership of banks.119  In respect of the former, through the Ministry of 
Finance, the South Korean government possessed the power to set the 
deposit rate and interest rate, and it consciously underpriced the rates to 
promote industrial investment.  The price was serious financial repression in 
South Korea between the 1950s and 1970s,120 featuring negative real interest 
rate charged by banks and low savings in South Korea.121 
In respect to government ownership, the banking system in South Korea 
was “the most extreme case of dependence on the state.”122  Unlike Japan, 
the South Korean government essentially owned all banks before the 1980s, 
including commercial banks and development banks.123  This allowed the 
South Korean government to control nearly all capital flows in South Korea 
and allocate credits on a discretionary basis,124 especially to extend loans 
with favorable rate to targeted firms and/or industries.125  Under this 
 
 119. Id. at 191. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 16. 
 120. “Financial repression” typically involves the government’s establishment of 
unattractive yields on domestic financial assets and allocation of scarce capital to selective 
groups of favored entrepreneurs. WOO, id. at 60. Financial repression was arguably what 
“imparted strength” to the South Korean government. WOO, id. at 191. 
 121. Id. at 60. The low-interest-rate retarded the accumulation of domestic savings and 
discouraged foreign lending, which hampered investment and economic growth. Thus, in 
1965, South Korea initiated the interest rate reform to increase the interest rate to mobilize 
domestic time and savings deposits. As a result, domestic time deposits and savings deposits 
rose. In response to the rising interest rate, chaebol became dependent on foreign loans to 
finance their investment. The high-interest-rate era between 1965 and 1972, however, was 
ended when the government bailed out highly-leveraged businesses by issuing a moratorium 
on all payment of corporate debts owed to the curb market and ended all market liberalization 
reforms: real interest rate again went down. Id. at 103-05, 111-15. Under the low-interest-rate 
policy, business and government savings kept flowing to the banking system, which, in turn, 
financed major industries at cheaper rates. Household savings, however, flowed to the curb 
market, which, in turn, financed small and medium enterprises that had no access to bank 
loans. This presented a “bifurcation of the financial market.” The average cost of borrowing 
in curb market during 1974-1980 was reportedly higher than that of general bank loans by 
25.2 percentage points. Id. at 159-60. 
 122. Id. at 11. 
 123. This began in 1961 when the military government, led by the later President Park 
Chung-Hee, launched the coup and took over the power. The military government, acting 
against the United States’ policy recommendation, nationalized all South Korean banks.   
 124. The only exception was the curb market. On the one hand, due to the rationed credit 
market, small enterprises which failed to be favored by the government could not borrow in 
the formal banking market and thus had no choice but to turn to the curb market, which created 
the demand for credits. On the other hand, due to the low-interest-rate environment, 
households were less incentivized to deposit their money in the formal banking system than 
to inject their money into the curb market for higher returns, which created the supply of 
credits. It was estimated that in 1971, the size of the curb market accounted for at least one-
third of bank loans. For more discussion, see WOO, supra note 109, at 111-15. 
 125. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 72-74, 149. 
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governance structure, bankers acted like bureaucrats than entrepreneurs, 
whose primary concerns were GDP instead of profits.126   
Even in the 1980s, when South Korea was compelled to commence 
financial liberalization and bank privatization,127 the government’s control 
over the banking system did not diminish much.  The government privatized 
all SBs by 1983.128  At the same time, however, fearing that chaebols might 
acquire privatized banks and become too-big-to-control, the government 
prohibited any single shareholder from holding more than 8 percent 
ownership of a national commercial bank.129  Thanks to the dispersed 
ownership structure, the government continued controlling commercial 
banks after the privatization.130 
This government-dominated banking system contributed to two main 
results: the post-war development of South Korea’s economy and the 
expansion of chaebols.131  On the one hand, the South Korean government 
 
 126. WOO, supra note 109, at 159. See also Yung-Chul Park & Dong-Won Kim, Korea: 
Development and Structural Change of the Banking System, in THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION 188, 189 (Hugh 
T. Patrick & Yung-Chul Park eds., 1994). To be sure, the ownership of these banks might be 
largely in private hands in the 1960s and 1970s; however, they were “de facto public 
enterprises” to the extent that voting rights of private shareholders were legislatively limited. 
Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly? Korea, Taiwan and 
the Asian Financial Crisis, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
GLOBAL FINANCE 80, 92 (Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill eds., 2000). 
 127. South Korea was forced to liberalize its finance in the 1980s for two primary reasons: 
First, to respond to the increasing pressure for trade liberalization from the international 
community, notably the United States, and second, to address the rising NPL problems. WOO, 
id. at 192. 
 128. In 1978, the government initiated the first bank privatization case, followed by 
another in 1981. By 1983, all seven banks in South Korea were privatized. Id. at 195. 
 129. Chaebol, however, tried certain ways to circumvent this shareholding restriction. For 
instance, they bought stocks in more than one bank to increase their influence in the whole 
banking system. They also used their subsidiaries to hold the ownership of banks. For 
instance, insurance companies owned a lot of bank stock, while chaebols controlled insurance 
companies. Samsung, for instance, was the largest shareholder of Commercial Bank and Hanil 
Bank in 1989, the two largest nationwide commercial bank in South Korea. Despite so, 
chaebol was still far from controlling the banking system. Instead, the South Korean 
government, through its rediscount function and the implicit guarantee of defaults, still 
extensively controlled privatized banks. Park & Kim, supra note 126, at 195-96. See also id. 
at 196. 
 130. Specifically, the government continued intervening in the management of banks by 
frequently rotating offices between bank management and governmental posts. For instance, 
in February 1991, the monetary authorities stepped in to name the presidents of five major 
banks. Through these intervening powers, the government kept its power to decide policy 
loans and allocate credits. AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 135; WOO, id. at 196; Noble & 
Ravenhill, supra note 126, at 93. Park & Kim, id. at 192. 
 131. WOO, id. at 15. 
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determined the allocation of credit based on export performance.132  Between 
1974 and 1980, the average cost of all loans for export industries was nearly 
always cheaper than loans to domestic industries.133  Besides, coinciding 
with the shift of industrial policies toward heavy industries in this period, the 
average cost of borrowings for heavy industries was significantly lower than 
light industries.134   
On the other hand, the South Korean government tended to favor large 
enterprises, i.e. chaebols.  In the same period, large enterprises always 
incurred less borrowing cost compared with small firms.135  There were two 
reasons for that.  First, since the industrial policies in this period supported 
heavy industries, which were capital intensive and could only be met by large 
chaebols, bankers in South Korea naturally followed the government’s 
policies and supported chaebols.  Second, under this banking system, the 
lending rates were at an artificially low level with a ceiling.  Thus, bankers 
in South Korea had no incentives to seek out enterprising yet riskier projects.  
Instead, they would prefer safer projects, that is, loans to chaebols favored 
by the government.136  Chaebols in South Korea thus grew and became too 
big to fail.137 
 
 132. To be sure, foreign investment also played a crucial role during South Korea’s post-
war growth period. In the 1970s, foreign loans in South Korea increased significantly: it was 
found that between 1965 and 1978, South Korea’s reliance on foreign financial markets 
increased for almost 100 times. Id. at 152-53. Foreign banks were willing to lend to South 
Korea mostly due to political reasons: they believed that the American government, out of 
political needs, would support the South Korean government and acted as the last resort. This 
formed the primary source of fund financing the Big Push industrial policies toward heavy 
industries in the 1970s. Id. at 153-58. Foreign credits, however, flowed into South Korea 
mostly via the government-owned banking system. Thomas Kalinowsky & Hyekyung Cho, 
The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization in South Korea, 49:2 ASIAN SURVEY 221, 
224 (2009). 
 133. WOO, id. at 167. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 166-67. 
 136. Id. at 166-68. 
 137. In 1978, the top twenty chaebols contributed to one-third of South Korea’s GDP. Id. 
at 15. See also id. at 172-75. 
The South Korean government also favored chaebols by relaxing the regulation of non-bank 
financial intermediaries (“NBFIs”). NBFIs were investment and finance companies which 
engaged in commercial papers as well as life insurance companies and investment trust 
companies. In the 1980s, the South Korean government engaged in a series of deregulation of 
NBFIs, including the permission of private ownership, greater flexibility in interest rates, 
relaxing entry barriers, removing the burden to support policy loans, expanding permitted 
financial activities, etc. NBFI deposit thus soared in the 1980s from 30.1 percent of total 
deposit in 1980 to 51.3 percent in 1987. Due to the deregulation, chaebols largely entered into 
the NBFI market through the large-scale acquisition of NBFIs. See id. at 196-97. In this vein, 
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The case of South Korea supported the idea of SBs and financial 
repression.  In Amsden’s words, South Korea provided “supporting evidence 
for the proposition that economic expansion depends on governmental 
intervention to create price distortions that direct economic activity toward 
greater investment.”138 
 
b.  Taiwan: A Party-State-Owned Banking System 
 
Taiwan was another rapidly growing East Asian developmental state 
during this period.  From 1961 to 1995, Taiwan’s GDP grew from US$1.78 
billion to US$279.22 billion,139 which was equal to 157 times growth.  In 
1995, Taiwan ranked the 19th largest economy in the world. 
Similar to Japan and South Korea, Taiwan also achieved its economic 
success by adopting the developmental state model.140  Its features, however, 
were different.  Instead of relying on gigantic private business groups, 
Taiwan’s economic development during its high-growth period was 
characterized by dominant SOEs as well as vibrant small and medium private 
enterprises (“SMPEs”).141  On the one hand, SOEs were bigger and more 
 
the control over domestic finance in South Korea, to some extent, shifted from the government 
to chaebols; liberalization in effect “contributed to a rise, not to a decline, in economic 
concentration.” AMSDEN, supra note 109, at 134-36. It was reported that in 1983, 69.6 percent 
of bank loans in South Korea went to 400 large firms belonging to 137 chaebols. The share 
of the 50 largest chaebols in total domestic credit was 26.5 percent, while the combined share 
of the three largest ones (Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung) accounted for over 10 percent. 
WOO, id. at 170. 
 138. AMSDEN, id. at 14. 
 139. Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan, https:// 
www.dgbas.gov.tw/point.asp?index=1 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
 140. On this, Robert Wade provided the most comprehensive study of the developmental 
state model in Taiwan. See generally ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2nd ed., 2004). 
See also J. MEGAN GREENE, THE ORIGINS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN TAIWAN: SCIENCE 
POLICY AND THE QUEST FOR MODERNIZATION (2008). 
 141. This was partly because Taiwan’s ruling party then, Kuomintang (“KMT,”) was a 
“foreign” regime to local Taiwanese people. When KMT retreated from the mainland to 
Taiwan, many Mainlanders, i.e., those who came after 1949 and their dependents, migrated 
to Taiwan with KMT. These Mainlanders, however, accounted for only 12 percent to 15 
percent of the population in Taiwan. WADE, id. at 233. That was why “Taiwan has always 
been less totalitarian than Japan between the two World Wars or South Korea during much of 
the Park era.” WADE, id. at 250. As a minority ruler, KMT feared the presence of some strong 
local groups that could challenge its ruling legitimacy. Accordingly, instead of supporting 
large private business groups and risking giving too much power to local Taiwanese people, 
KMT preferred building Taiwan’s economy on SOEs, which were under its control, and 
SMPEs, which were too small to become a threat. This resulted in the “SOEs+SMPEs” model 
in Taiwan. 
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prevalent in Taiwan than in South Korea.  Since the 1950s, Taiwan possessed 
“one of the biggest public enterprise sectors outside the communist bloc and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.”142  These Taiwanese SOEs mostly concentrated on 
sectors which were capital-intensive, large in scale, and upstream.  By 
controlling these sectors, the Taiwanese government obtained indirect 
influence over downstream sectors, which facilitated its control of Taiwan’s 
economy.143  On the other hand, unlike Japan or South Korea whose economy 
was geared by large private conglomerates (either the keiretsu or the 
chaebol), Taiwanese business groups played a less central role in Taiwan’s 
economy.144  In their place were small family firms which were at the heart 
of the economy’s manufacturing revolution.145  In light of this “SOEs + 
SMPEs” model, the case of Taiwan is of more reference value to China to 
the extent that CCP similarly builds China’s economy on influential SOEs 
and vibrant SMPEs.146 
Moreover, Taiwan was shockingly similar to China in political terms 
because it also adopted a party-state regime during its high-growth period.  
Similar to CCP, KMT implemented the so-called “quasi-Leninist” style of 
organizational structure.  As Wade described, “[t]he party’s organization 
stretches from the standing committee at the top to cells in schools, 
universities, factories and neighborhoods.  At the higher levels it has a 
structure of offices to watch over the rest of the society …  Almost all senior 
civilian officials and military officers are also party members, and many hold 
high party offices as well.  In consequence there is a constant blurring of the 
 
 142. Id. at 173. Besides, the government possessed much more influence in many other 
firms which were not public enterprises. For instance, the government might take minority 
share and make up the balance through KMT’s holding company. It was estimated that KMT 
owned about fifty firms. Id. at 273. 
 143. Id. at 178-80. KMT also dominated these key sectors to prevent them from being 
dominated by foreign enterprises. 
 144. In the 1980s, it was estimated that only 40 percent of the 500 largest manufacturing 
firms in Taiwan belonged to a business group, while most of Taiwanese enterprises remained 
single-unit operations. Id. at 66. 
 145. Id. at 66-70. This can be observed by the fact that most of Taiwan’s exports came 
from small and medium firms. For instance, in 1976, the top 500 domestic firms in Taiwan 
by sales accounted for only 27 percent of total exports, indicating that small and medium 
enterprises also contributed significantly to Taiwan’s exportation. 
 146. Taiwan is similar to China in other aspects as well. In cultural terms, Taiwan is also 
a Chinese society, sharing similar cultural characteristics, such as the language of Mandarin, 
the philosophy of Confucianism, and other traditions. In historic terms, the government of 
Taiwan during its high-growth period was KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek, which was the 
former government of China before CCP took over China in 1949. After being defeated by 
China, KMT fled to Taiwan with its remnant power and institutions, claiming that it was the 
legitimate government of China and hoping that someday it could recover the mainland. 
Accordingly, there was a historical continuation between Taiwan and China. 
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distinction between the party and government at the top.  The party also has 
many industrial and commercial enterprises under its more or less direct 
control, through which comes much of its finance.”147  This description of 
KMT shockingly fits the common impression of CCP.148   
Under this economic and political background, the ability to control 
finance and upstream raw materials was an essential means for KMT to 
possess “powerful and selective instruments of control” of the economy.149  
Due to KMT’s constraint of capital markets in Taiwan, Taiwan’s financial 
system was bank-led as well.150  Moreover, KMT tightly administered the 
banking system.  When retreating to Taiwan, KMT brought over the SBs 
from China to Taiwan.151  It further nationalized Taiwanese private banks 
 
 147. Id. at 236. For a comprehensive introduction to KMT’s organizational structure, 
ideology, and control over the Taiwanese society, see id. at 228-96. 
 148. Besides, KMT also shared a similar ideology with CCP in economic affairs. 
Specifically, built on Sun Yat-Sen’s Three Principles of the People, KMT placed SOEs at the 
centrality of the economy. Consider the following description of KMT, which again seems 
like a description of CCP: 
Any group which wants a reduction of the government’s economic role must show how such 
a reduction would remain consistent with the economic principles of Sun Yat-Sen. Any group 
which wants extensive denationalization must counter those who say that public enterprises 
in the commanding heights are essential to those principles. 
Id. at 261. 
 149. Id. at 270. 
 150. KMT, similar to Japan, South Korea, and China, preferred a bank-led economy over 
an equity-based economy because it did not want businesses to have their source of finance 
that could allow them to grow out of control. Therefore, it constrained the development of 
capital markets in Taiwan. For instance, it controlled the stock exchange by controlling the 
Securities and Futures Commission which supervised the stock exchange, which discouraged 
many local businesses from listing in the stock market. LAI IN-JAW (賴英照), THE 
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT OF TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE (台灣金融版圖之回顧與
前瞻) 26-38 (1997). See also LIN PAO-AN, FINANCE AND SOCIETY: POST-WAR EVOLUTION OF 
TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND CREDITS (金融與社會：戰後臺灣金融體系與信用的演
進) 17-52 (2012). Eventually, KMT built a bank-led financial system in Taiwan which was 
based on credit rather than equity. By 1980, it was estimated that bank asset accounted for 95 
percent of the assets of Taiwan’s major financial institutions. Id. at 159. 
That said, due to KMT’s policy to avoid creating large local business groups, it did not want 
companies to have their source of finance or build conglomerates around banks. Accordingly, 
it did not want a Japanese main bank system. Due to this concern, different from Japan while 
similar to South Korea, KMT prohibited Taiwanese banks from taking shares in the borrowing 
companies (even the development bank only began to take equity positions in 1982). It also 
prohibited holding companies or non-bank financial institutions (such as insurance 
companies) from owning industrial firms and restricted the growth of the official money 
market. WADE, id. at 264. 
 151. Before migrating to Taiwan, KMT adopted a government-dominated model for 
governing the banking system in China.  Major Chinese banks during that period were owned 
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that were incorporated during the Japanese colonial ages.  Based on the 
government-owned Mainland banks, nationalized local banks, and the newly 
incorporated SBs, KMT built a banking system dominated by the party-state 
in Taiwan.152  Besides, KMT’s quasi-Leninist ruling also extended to the 
banking system.  For instance, the regulations governing bank employees 
essentially followed those applied to civil servants.153  KMT also appointed 
senior bankers, dictated salary scales, and regulated annual bonuses of bank 
staff.154  Despite KMT’s intervention, Taiwanese banks were able to make 
big profits thanks to the strong demand for credits, limited competition in the 
market, and the government-mandated margin between the lending rate and 
borrowing rate.155 
This “party-state-dominated” banking system supported Taiwan’s post-
war economic development.156  Through its control of finance, KMT 
channeled domestic savings to targeted sectors in various ways.  
Institutionally, it incorporated several specialized banks engaging in 
 
and operated by the government (especially local governments) and subject to policy 
intervention. They were mostly the so-called “professional banks,” supplying bank finance to 
specific industries or targets while incurring the waste of social resources by governments and 
government-owned enterprises. 
 152. In 1980, there were only four private banks in Taiwan, accounting for only 5 percent 
of deposits of all commercial banks, while the Taiwanese government owned and controlled 
the rest seven banks. Id. at 161. For more introduction to the banking landscape in Taiwan 
before the 1990s, see LAI, supra note 150, at 3-53. 
In addition to government-owned financial companies, KMT also had its party-owned 
financial businesses, including the China Investment and Trust, China Development 
Corporation, China United Trust and Investment, Fuh-Hua Securities Finance, etc. Ya-Hwei 
Yang, Taiwan: Development and Structural Change of the Banking System, in THE FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, KOREA, AND TAIWAN: GROWTH, REPRESSION, AND LIBERALIZATION 
288, 299 (Hugh T. Patrick & Yung-Chul Park eds., 1994).  
 153. WADE, supra note 140, at 264. 
 154. Id. at 161-62. In practice, the premier or provincial governor typically appointed 
former officials in the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank to serve the chairmen of banks. 
 155. Id. at 164. The benefits of this financial system were the reduction of savers’ risks 
and high rate of financial savings. The costs, however, were rigidity. For instance, due to the 
limited competition among banks and the control of interest rate, financial repression was 
serious in Taiwan as well, which led to a robust curb market. It was estimated that the curb 
market supplied around 30 percent of total loans over the 1970s, at rates 50 percent to 100 
percent higher than bank loan rates. Id. at 161. Under this setting, there was similarly a 
bifurcation in Taiwan’s credit markets, where large businesses, especially SOEs, financed 
themselves mainly through the banking system while leaving small businesses to the curb 
market. Id. at 171. For a discussion of how small businesses overcame financial repression in 
Taiwan, see LIN, supra note 150, at 83-128. 
 156. To be sure, in addition to the banking system, the Taiwanese government also used 
special-purpose funds and loan guarantees to support targeted industries or sectors. See 
WADE, id. at 167-71. 
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specialized businesses, ranging from agriculture, land, small and medium 
enterprises, export-import, to development.  Furthermore, it directed banks 
to extend preferential lending to indicated priority industries with strong 
export potential.157  In practice, Bank of Communications and Medium 
Business Bank of Taiwan undertook the major duty to extend these strategic 
industry loans, and about 20 percent-25 percent of their funds came from the 
Executive Yuan’s Development Fund with 175 to 275 basis points lower 
rate.158  In this way, KMT’s control of finance facilitated its industrial 
policies and promoted Taiwan’s exportation.159 
The case of Taiwan illustrates that a banking system dominated by a 
party-state, together with the adoption of industrial policies based on SOEs 
and SMPEs, can also create economic success. 
 
c.  Singapore: A Business-oriented Government-owned Banking 
System 
 
Singapore is another worth noted developmental state in East Asia.160  
From 1960 to 1995, Singapore’s GDP grew from US$0.7 billion to US$87.9 
 
 157. For instance, in 1978 it was estimated that up to 75 percent of bank loans flowed to 
these targeted industries. Id. at 166-67, 171. 
 158. Yang, supra note 151, at 308. 
 159. To be sure, Taiwan’s government-bank-industry model differed with South Korea in 
scale. The amount of policy loans in Taiwan was significantly less than that in South Korea. 
Most crucially, the Taiwanese government preferred to rely on tax incentives instead of policy 
loans to pursue its industrial policies. Taiwan was portrayed as one of the first developing 
economies to adopt tax scheme to promote development, making incentives to industries 
achieving the high-performance standard, and/or engaging in strategic industries. WADE, 
supra note 140, at 182-83. This was mainly due to Taiwan’s unique diplomatic status. Absent 
official connection with most major international organizations (such as IMF) and countries 
(such as the United States), Taiwan could hardly seek assistance from the international 
community once hit by a financial crisis. Accordingly, “[t]he government [gave] particularly 
high priority to economic stabilization, even at the cost of very rapid industrial restructuring,” 
which limited “the use of selective credit as a primary instrument for steering the behavior of 
private firms as compared to Korea.” WADE, id. at 296. Under this setting, the effect of 
strategic loans in Taiwan was less prominent. WADE, supra note 140, at 191-92. See also 
Yang, supra note 151, at 308 (reported that these strategic loans might have little impact: 
subsidized firms reported that they would have made investments even without the 
preferential loans; the loans did not reduce the cost of capital significantly, etc.) 
 160. See Alan Chong, Singapore’s Political Economy, 1997–2007: Strategizing 
Economic Assurance for Globalization, 47: 6 ASIAN SURVEY 952, 953-54 (2007). For more 
discussion, see Thomas J. Bellows, Economic Challenges and Political Innovation: The Case 
of Singapore, 32:4 ASIAN AFFAIRS 231 (2006); Linda Low, The Singapore Developmental 
State in the New Economy and Polity, 14:3 PACIFIC REVIEW 411 (2001); W. G. Huff, The 
Developmental State, Government, and Singapore’s Economic Development since 1960, 23:8 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1421 (1995). 
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billion,161 which was equal to 126 times growth.  Its economic growth was 
also steady: except for 1964, 1985 and 1986, in these thirty-five years, 
Singapore managed to maintain at least 4.5 percent of annual GDP growth 
rate.162  After five decades of development, Singapore has now become one 
of the richest countries in the world.  In 2018, its GDP per capita in nominal 
terms was US$64,582,163 ranking the seventh among world countries and the 
third in real terms.  Most importantly, since its separation from Malaysia in 
1965, Singapore maintains a “soft authoritarianism” regime in political 
terms164 while adopting government ownership extensively in economic 
terms.  Singapore’s marvelous economic achievement accompanied by the 
government-led development model is appealing to many developing 
countries, including China.165 
Singapore’s development model is based on a “two-legged” policy that 
relies on multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and government-linked 
corporations (“GLCs”) for industrialization.  Here I focus on the second 
leg.166  The Singaporean government adopted the famous “Temasek model” 
to manage large GLCs to spearhead development.  The Temasek model 
possesses two major characteristics.  First, the Singaporean government has 
a noticeable presence in the economy through GLCs (i.e., entities in which a 
holding company wholly-owned by the Singaporean government has an 
equity interest of 20 percent or more).  To manage these GLCs, the 
Singaporean government created many state holding companies.  Among 
 
 161. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Singapore, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1995&locations=SG&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 18, 2019). 
 162. Id. 
 163. World Bank Open Data, GDP per capita – Singapore, http://data.worldbank. 
org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=SG&start=1960 (last visited Aug. 
18, 2019). 
 164. Marco Verweji & Riccardo Pelizzo, Singapore: Does Authoritarianism Pay?, 20:2 
J. DEMOCRACY 18, 18-19 (2009). 
 165. Much China-study literature proposes that China may consider following 
Singapore’s development model. For a summary, see Cheng-Han Tan et al., State-owned 
Enterprises in Singapore: Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform, 28:2 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 61, 62-63 (2015). 
 166. The first leg, i.e., MNCs, is a distinguishing feature of Singapore’s model as opposed 
to other East Asian developmental states. Instead of pursuing protectionism to develop 
domestic industries, Singapore depended heavily on foreign direct investment to push for 
Singapore’s economic development. In the process of attracting foreign investment, the 
Singaporean government played a crucial role, ranging from regulating labor wages to create 
attractive labor environment, awarding tax incentives to reduce investment cost, establishing 
government-forced savings (i.e., the Central Provident Fund “CPF”) to finance infrastructure 
development, to subsidizing foreign investors, etc. For a discussion, see Wolf, supra note 160, 
at 1424-30. With these efforts, Singapore creates one of the best doing business environment 
for foreign direct investment to contribute to Singapore’s economic development. 
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them, Temasek Holdings, which is wholly owned by the Singaporean 
Ministry of Finance, is the largest one.167  Through these GLCs, especially 
through its control over the personnel of GLCs, the Singaporean government 
ensures its control of strategically important industries.168  Second, despite 
its ownership and control, the Singaporean government interferes in these 
GLCs only minimally to allow them to run on commercial principles.  In 
general, the corporate governance of Temasek and all GLCs is quite 
profession-oriented.169  Moreover, Temasek only proposes broad strategies 
to its GLCs, leaving most of the managerial affairs to the company’s 
management instead of the board of directors.170  The appraisal and 
compensation of the appointed civil servants are also based on standards of 
the private sector.171  Under this government-owned-professionally-managed 
system, GLCs play an important role in Singapore’s economy.172 
 
 167. Temasek is one of the two major sovereign wealth funds managed by the 
Singaporean government (the other one is Government of Singapore Investment Company 
Private Limited (“GIC”)). Temasek holds subsidiaries in a wide range of industries, including 
transportation, logistics, shipment, engineering, telecommunications, manufacturing, 
properties, power, and finance, amounting to an estimated US$180 billion portfolio 
investment. Christopher Chen, Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises: The Path of the Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for China, 36:2 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 313 (2016). For a more detailed description of Temasek’s investment 
portfolio, see Chen, supra note 167, at 326-31. For a discussion of the business of Temasek, 
see Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Singaporean Business Groups: The Role of the State and Capital in 
Singapore, Inc., in BUSINESS GROUPS IN EAST ASIA: FINANCIAL CRISIS, RESTRUCTURING, AND 
NEW GROWTH 94 (Sea-Jin Chang ed., 2006). 
 168. For instance, it is documented that Temasek prefers to appoint former politicians, 
civil servants, and high-ranking military officials to positions as chairmen, directors, and 
senior management in the GLCs. Tsui-Auch, id. at 104. Although GLCs also recruits outside 
management talent, the Singaporean government maintains its control of GLCs through this 
“closely-knit political elite.” Tsui-Auch, id. at 105-06. It is also noted that after the Asian 
Financial Crisis Temasek has appointed even more former officials in GLCs. Linda Low, 
Rethinking Singapore Inc. and GLCs, SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 282, 289 (2002). 
 169. For instance, all of Temasek’s directors have considerable business experience in 
Singapore. Although Temasek appoints former civil servants on GLCs’ boards, these 
appointees only serve a monitoring role. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 88-90. To be sure, some 
level of political intervention remains inevitable. For instance, it is reported that Temasek’s 
decisions have sometimes been made in close consultation with the government. Temasek’s 
CEO Madam Ho Ching is the wife of Singapore’s current Prime Minister Lee Hsien-Loong, 
the eldest son of Lee Kuan-Yew. 
 170. Tan et al., id. at 88-90. 
 171. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 104. 
 172. It is estimated that GLCs accounted for around 37 percent of the total stock market 
capitalization among Singapore’s listed companies in the 2010s. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 
67. 
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Singapore’s banking system is also part of the Temasek system.  After 
a wave of bank consolidation after the Asian Financial Crisis, the current 
banking market in Singapore consists of three main banking groups: the 
Development Bank of Singapore (“DBS,” accounting for 39.63 percent of 
market share), the United Overseas Bank (“UOB,” accounting for 29.38 
percent of market share) and the Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation 
(“OCBC,” accounting for 27.81 percent of market share), which altogether 
dominated 97 percent of market share in Singapore in 2011.173  They are not 
only the largest three banking groups in Singapore but also the largest three 
business groups among all Singaporean businesses.174  Among them, DBS is 
owned by the Singaporean government through the Temasek.  As of 2018, 
Temasek, directly and indirectly, owned at least 29.93 percent of DBS’s 
shares,175 which allowed the Singaporean government to influence around 
40 percent share of Singapore’s banking market.176  The Singaporean 
government also borrows the practice of “amakudari (descent from heaven)” 
from Japan to increase its influence.  Several former and current ministers 
and top civil servants have served as chairpersons and directors in these 
private banks,177 which facilitates the communication between the 
government and banks. 
The extensive government ownership of corporations and banks does 
not appear to compromise the economic efficiency of Singapore’s industries.  
Empirical studies found that Singapore’s GLCs perform better than private 
companies: their ROA and ROE are superior, their market valuation is 
higher, and they are also better at managing expenses.178  GLCs also appear 
to maintain better corporate governance practice, such as retaining more 
outside directors and independent directors.179  In the banking sector, the 
government’s ownership also contributes significantly to Singapore’s 
 
 173. SHEN CHUN-HUA (沈中華) & WANG LEE-RONG (王儷容), THE KEY FOR TAIWANESE 
BANKING INDUSTRIES TO GO GLOBAL: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES WITH SINGAPORE AND 
AUSTRALIA (台灣銀行業走向全球關鍵：與星澳之比較分析) 103-04 (2014). 
 174. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 96-98. 
 175. DBS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2018 210-11 (2019). 
 176. Despite the government’s ownership of DBS, it is reported that the Singaporean 
government does not appear to interfere with the management of DBS or force it to extend 
policy credits. Chen, supra note 167, at 352-53. 
 177. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 102. 
 178. For a summary of these empirical studies, see Tan et al., supra note 165, at 67-69. 
 179. For instance, compared with family business groups, GLCs retain more outside 
managers after the Asian Financial Crisis. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 107-10. Besides, 
Temasek is a strong advocate of independent directors after the Asian Financial Crisis, and 
GLCs retain more independent directors than non-GLCs. Tan et al., id. at 90-91; Chen, supra 
note 167, at 339-47. 
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industrialization.  Lee Kuan-Yew, the founding father of Singapore, used to 
publicly praise DBS that it “helped finance entrepreneurs who needed 
venture capital because [the] established banks had no experience outside 
trade financing and were too conservative and reluctant to lend to would-be 
manufacturers.”180   
Observers often attribute Singapore’s success in maintaining an 
efficient GLCs system to its unique political background.  Singapore is a soft 
authoritarianism regime ruled by a single party, i.e., the People’s Action 
Party (“PAP”), for more than five decades.  To win the popular support to 
sustain its ruling legitimacy, PAP is compelled to deliver good lives to 
Singaporeans; thus, it is incentivized to provide good economic management 
to improve Singapore’s economy.181  This urges the Singaporean government 
to manage GLCs efficiently from time to time.182 
The case of Singapore illustrates that an authoritarian regime holding 
extensive ownership of the banking sector can still pursue economic 
efficiency and create economic success. 
 
C.  Summary: A Relative Theory of Private versus Public Sectors 
 
In sum, many East Asian economies achieved their economic growth 
while maintaining a government-dominated banking system.  To be sure, I 
do not raise these cases to argue that the government-dominated banking 
model is superior.  As will be discussed in the next section, many East Asian 
economies went into financial crises in the 1990s, which suggested the limits 
of this model.  That said, these cases, together with China,183 present the first 
half of a relative theory that justifies the government’s control of banking 
sectors. 
Private sectors and public sectors possess their relative strength and 
weakness in developing an economy.  On the one hand, private sectors 
 
 180. Tan et al., id. at 81. 
 181. Id. at 69, 85-87. For instance, to deliver good economic management, PAP was 
forced to prioritize free-market principles and encourage foreign investment. Ashish Lall & 
Ming-Hua Liu, Liberalization of Financial and Capital Markets – Singapore is Almost There, 
28 L. & POL’Y IN INT’L BUS. 619, 619-21 (1997). For an introduction to the economic and 
political background of PAP’s ruling of Singapore in the 1960s, see Tan et al., id. at 69-77. 
 182. For instance, after the Asian Financial Crisis, to diversify the risk exposure to 
weather the economic downturn, Singapore responded quickly by initiating a going global 
policy which aimed to bring Singapore’s economy beyond the region of Southeast Asia. Tsui-
Auch, supra note 167, at 94. For more discussion, see Chong, supra note 160. In the process, 
the Singaporean government and GLCs played crucial roles in investing abroad, resulting in 
an interesting phenomenon of “statist globalization.” See Chong, supra note 160, at 955-69. 
 183. For studies finding that China is similarly a developmental state, see Andrzej Bolesta, 
China as a Developmental State, 5 MONTENEGRIN J. ECON. 106 (2007). 
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pursue business interests based on their cost and benefit calculation, which 
makes them more operationally efficient.  Several market failures, however, 
may prevent them from acting developmental.  For instance, they could be 
short-termist and thus less inclined to invest in long-term projects that are 
development-promoting.  In addition, they may incur collective action 
problems which prevent them from coordinating into a grander development 
project.184  In light of the limits of private sectors, public sectors can perform 
better in kick-starting an economy’s growth at its initial stage of 
development.  Specifically, through the government’s coordination, public 
sectors are more likely to mobilize related resources and concentrate on a 
single strategically important industry, which, in turn, employs scale of 
economy to formulate a complete industry eco-system.  Some studies of 
development economics have documented that even those most neo-liberal 
economies (such as United Kingdom, United States, or Hong Kong) had a 
period of state protection and support of their financial markets before their 
financial markets developed.185 
 
IV.  The Transition of East Asian Developmental States 
 
By far, the proposed relative theory seems supporting China’s 
development theory.  The relative theory, however, is less optimistic of the 
sustainability of a banking sector dominated by a party-state.  The relative 
theory takes into account the dynamism in the course of an economy’s 
development and thus contains a temporal element.  It predicts that, as an 
economy develops and the private sectors mature, the relative efficiency of 
the state sector vis-à-vis the private sector in developing an economy might 
reverse.  The state’s control of the banking sector would thus become 
increasingly inefficient.  For example, the state’s allocation of funds might 
become less efficient than the market’s, which results in more bad loans and 
less support of productive sectors.  At a critical point, the state needs to 
readjust its role in the banking sector. 
The experience of East Asian developmental states again illustrates in 
what circumstances and in what ways would a state-dominated banking 
system evolve toward a more market-oriented model as the economy grows.  
All these economies encountered challenges in the 1990s and thus adjusted 
the state’s role in their banking systems.  That said, due to the different 
 
 184. For a related discussion, see Randall Morck, Finance and Governance in Developing 
Economies 3 ANNUAL REV. FIN. ECON. 375 (2011). 
 185. See, e.g., Svetlana Andrianova et al., Political Economy Origins of Financial 
Markets in Europe and Asia, 39:5 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 686 (2011). 
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background and institutions, each economy adopted different approaches of 
adjustment, which offers a variety of transition models. 
 
A.  The Adjustment of the State’s Role in East Asian 
Developmental States 
1. Japan: An Economy-driven Evolution Featuring Regulatory Reforms 
Although Japan maintained a milder degree of governmental 
intervention in its banking system, it ran into troubles in the 1990s.  In 1994, 
two urban credit cooperatives, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen, collapsed and 
opened the banking crisis in Japan.186  The crisis then spread to large city 
banks: Hokkaido Takushoku Bank collapsed in 1997.  It also spread to long-
term credit banks: Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank, 
went nearly insolvent and were nationalized respectively in 1998 and 
1999.187  Between 1994 and 2003, 171 Japanese banks failed, including one 
city bank, two long-term credit banks, one regional bank, 12 second regional 
banks, 23 shinkin banks, and 132 credit cooperatives.188 
The causes of the banking crisis in Japan were many.  The most 
proximate one was the asset bubble in the stock market and real estate market 
in the late 1980s and the burst of the bubble in the 1990s.189  Compared with 
their respective price in 1985, the price of the stock market at its peak in 
1989 and the price of the urban real estate market at its peak in 1991 almost 
tripled.  In 2000, however, this growth had dissipated.190  Many causes could 
explain the rise and burst of the asset bubble, such as financial liberalization 
in the 1980s, easier monetary conditions following the Plaza Agreement in 
1985, the overconfidence in the prospective of Japan’s economy, poor credit 
risk management by banks, and weak prudential regulation.191  The burst of 
the asset bubble also resulted in a serious economic recession in Japan.  From 
1992 to 2002, known as the “Lost Decade,” Japan’s annual GDP growth rate 
 
 186. Hirofumi Uchida & Gregory Udell, Banking in Japan, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
BANKING 873, 899 (Allen N. Berger et al., eds., 2014). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Edward J Lincoln, Japan: Ongoing Financial Deregulation, Structural Change, and 
Performance, 1990–2010, in HOW FINANCE IS SHAPING THE ECONOMIES OF CHINA, JAPAN, 
AND KOREA 143, 149 (Yung Chul Park & Hugh Patrick eds., 2013). 
 190. Id. at 149-50. 
 191. Wataru Takahashi, The Japanese Financial Sector’s Transition from High Growth 
to the “Lost Decades”, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE 
201, 213 (Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2012). For a summary of the causes of the 
banking crisis in Japan, see Uchida & Udell, supra note 186, at 901-02. 
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was only 0.8 percent on average.192  The economic stagnation turned the 
attention of Japanese reformers to the inefficiency of Japan’s financial 
system. 
Against this background, banking reforms taken by Japan since the late 
1990s were mainly regulatory, known as the “Big Bang” reform.193  Part of 
the Big Bang reform aimed at establishing a modern banking supervisory 
structure to address the banking crisis.  Japan established the Financial 
Services Agency (“FSA”) in 1998 to assume the financial supervisory 
authority from the Ministry of Finance.194  To combat NPLs in the banking 
system, FSA required banks to write off their bad loans in the 2000s, which 
shrank the NPLs of Japanese banks from 43.2 trillion yen in 2002 to 12.0 
trillion yen in 2007.195  To establish minimum protection against capital risks, 
FSA introduced the Basel capital rules to regulate the capital adequacy of 
Japanese banks.  These reforms built a more prudent regulatory environment 
for Japan’s banking sectors.   
On the other hand, part of the Big Bang reform aimed at deregulating 
the financial sector to enhance the financial efficiency in supporting the 
economy.  For instance, by permitting the incorporation of financial holding 
companies in 1997, Japan liberalized the long separation of banks from 
securities firms, which led to the combination of fifteen large banks and other 
financial institutions into four major financial holdings.196 
The Big Bang reform also tackled the Japanese government’s 
intervention in the banking system.197  FILP and postal savings were the 
principal targets.  Reformers criticized the politically-motivated allocation 
of funds made by FILP and postal savings and argued that these 
mismanagements led to excessive public works which caused the asset 
bubble.198  To mitigate the governmental intervention, reformers firstly 
established the Postal Savings Agency in 2001 to take charge of postal 
 
 192. World Bank Open Data, GDP – Japan, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY. 
GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2002&locations=JP&start=1992 (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
 193. For a summary of the Big Bang reform during this period, see Lincoln, supra note 
189, at 184. For a brief introduction to the evolution of the banking system in Japan, see 
Takahashi, id. 
 194. For a brief introduction to why the Ministry of Finance’s power was deprived, see 
Lincoln, id. at 180-83. 
 195. Id. at 155. 
 196. Id. at 156. 
 197. For a summary of the reforms targeting at government financial intermediation, see 
id. at 185-90. 
 198. It was found that the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party in Japan then, used 
loans from government banks for political purposes, such as their recommended electoral 
candidates who were electorally vulnerable or senior. See generally Imai, supra note 99. 
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savings services.199  The reform further ensured the operational 
independence of the Postal Savings Agency by allowing it to invest its fund 
without turning over to the Ministry of Finance.  In 2003, the Postal Savings 
Agency was corporatized into the Japan Post, a government-owned 
company.  In 2006, insisted by Premier Junichiro Koizumi, the Japan Post 
drafted a long-term privatization plan, under which it would: first, transform 
into a holding company holding all the shares of the savings bank; and 
second, sell two-thirds of the shares of the savings bank to private investors 
on a progressive basis throughout 2010-2017.200  The first part of the plan 
was realized in 2007: the Japan Post, a government-wholly-owned holding 
company, incorporated the Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Life Insurance 
to conduct postal savings businesses and life insurance businesses 
respectively.  Today, the Japan Post Bank is the single largest depository 
institution in Japan.201  The second part of the plan has also been on its way.  
In 2015, Japan’s Ministry of Finance initiated a “triple-head” IPO plan, in 
which it sold 11 percent shares of the Japan Post, Japan Post Bank, and Japan 
Post Life to the public.202  In addition to the privatization of Japan Post, other 
government financial institutions experienced significant changes as well.203  
These reforms “paved the way for a smaller role of government in mediating 
financial flows.”204 
In sum, Japan’s banking reform was mainly a response to the banking 
crisis and economic recession in the 1990s.  Japan reduced the government’s 
intervention in the banking system by adjusting the government’s role from 
a guider, which frequently issued administrative guidance without legal 
basis, to a regulator, which supervised banks based on banking laws and 
regulations.  The case of Japan suggests that excessive governmental 
intervention in the banking system could result in excessive infrastructure 
 
 199. Uchida & Udell, supra note 186, at 886-87. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Atsuko Fukase, Japan Post Prepares to Deliver $12 Billion IPO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
2, 2015. 
 203. For instance, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also pushed forward the 
privatization of JDB, which led to the corporatization of JDB into a government wholly-
owned company subject to future rounds of shares privatization. Several government financial 
institutions also merged into a single government organization, the Japan Finance 
Corporation, in 2008. 
 204. Lincoln, supra note 189, at 189. After these reforms, the current financial and 
banking system in Japan presents a different picture, but only in a modest degree. For instance, 
although equity finance increases, Japan remains a bank-led system. The misallocation of 
funds appears to continue: corporate sectors remain investing excessively, which leads to low 
ROE and ROA. Lincoln, id. at 217-18. 
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investment, which, in turn, result in an asset bubble.  As China’s real estate 
price continued to soar, China should closely watch if it has proceeded into 
this critical intersection. 
 
a.2.South Korea: A Crisis-driven Evolution Featuring Privatization 
 
In South Korea, its government- and chaebol-driven model also came 
with a price.  In contrast with Japan, South Korea had a strong government-
dominated banking system during the fast-growth period.  Under this 
government-dominated banking system, banks were less incentivized to 
establish their risk assessment capabilities.205  The government’s focused 
support of chaebols to pursue economies of scale thus resulted in hugely 
leveraged chaebols,206 serious NPL problems in the banking system,207 and 
low profitability of banks.208  These problems forced the South Korean 
government to commence a series of financial liberalization and bank 
privatization in the 1980s, but these reforms were in general “cosmetic” as 
mentioned above.209  The government continued controlling the management 
of privatized banks and dictating their lending decisions, which maintained 
the government-dominated banking system in South Korea. 
The first real challenge to this government-dominated banking system 
took place in 1993 when President Kim Yong-Sam took his office.  President 
Kim, as the first civilian president, shifted the national policy of South Korea 
from a development-oriented one to a globalization-oriented one.210  He 
abandoned industrial policies by merging the Economic Planning Board to 
the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which symbolized the demise of 
planning in South Korea.211  In addition, to apply for the OECD membership 
 
 205. Kiseok Hong & Jong-Wha Lee, Korea: Returning to Sustainable Growth?, in THE 
ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FOR A RESILIENT ASIA 203, 207-08 (Wing Thye Woo et al. 
eds., 2000). 
 206. The ratio of debt to equity in the 50 largest chaebols was at least 524 percent in 1980 
and 454.8 percent in 1985. Moreover, seven of them had a debt ratio over 1,000 percent: The 
highest one reached 47,699 percent. WOO, supra note 109, at 170.  
 207. The NPL ratio in the banking sector reached 13.7 percent in 1983 and 17 percent in 
1985. WOO, supra note 109, at 170. 
 208. The ROA of South Korean banks was 0.56 percent on average from 1990 to 1993 
and 0.26 percent in 1996. Noble & Ravenhill, supra note 126, at 93. 
 209. Yung Chul Park, Financial Development and Liberalization in Korea 1980–2011, in 
HOW FINANCE IS SHAPING THE ECONOMIES OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND KOREA 225, 227 (Hugh 
Patrick & Yung Chul Park eds., 2013). 
 210. Haeran Lim, Democratization and the Transformation Process in East Asian 
Developmental States: Financial Reform in Korea and Taiwan, 33:1 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 75, 
87 (2009). 
 211. Id. 
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in 1993, President Kim placed financial liberalization as his priority 
reforms.212  Specifically, he relaxed and gradually phased out capital account 
regulations.213  The liberalization largely enhanced chaebols’ financial 
autonomy while reducing the government’s control of the credits to 
chaebols, which shifted South Korea’s development model from a 
government-centered one to a chaebol-centered one.214 
The banking system in South Korea, however, went into troubles in 
1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis hit South Korea.  In South Korea, the 
financial crisis primarily resulted from the financial liberalization in the 
1990s.215  Due to the deregulation of capital flows, South Korean banks, 
financial institutions, and large businesses had greater access to cheaper 
foreign credits, which resulted in a spike of capital inflows from 1994 to 
1996.216  These foreign credits were, however, mainly short-term ones,217 
which flowed via the non-bank financial intermediaries (“NBFIs”) 
controlled by chaebols to the long-term investment projects of chaebols.218  
This resulted in maturity mismatch which rendered South Korea’s economy 
vulnerable to runs of short-term foreign credits.  In the 1990s, when South 
Korea’s trade performance turned bad due to Japanese yen’s depreciation, 
the vulnerability of South Korea’s banking system finally floated to the 
surface.  Foreign investors began to lose confidence in the South Korean 
economy and run.  This made the rollover of short-term foreign loans less 
available, which bankrupted several smaller chaebols.219  At the same time, 
as financial conditions of chaebols deteriorated, NPLs of South Korean 
banks spiked, which eventually resulted in the insolvency of many banks.220  
As foreign investors withdrew their short-term funding, the foreign reserve 
held by the Bank of Korea dropped rapidly.  This resulted in the downward 
adjustment of South Korea’s sovereign ratings, which made South Korea 
 
 212. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 225. 
 213. Park, supra note 209, at 227-28. 
 214. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 224-27. See also Noble & Ravenhill, supra 
note 126, at 82-83. 
 215. Hong & Lee, supra note 205, at 208. 
 216. Foreign capital inflow increased from 30 percent of South Korea’s GDP in 1994 to 
47 percent in 1996. 
 217. In 1996, it was estimated that nearly 60% of credit in South Korea was short-term 
with a maturity of less than one year. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 226-27. 
 218. This provided “a seemingly unlimited credit supply” that “further pushed the chaebol 
into their high-flying and high-risk investment plans.” Id. at 226. 
 219. The failure of chaebols started from Hanbo, the fourteenth largest conglomerate in 
South Korea, in January 1997, followed by smaller ones such as Sammi, Jinro and Dainong, 
then the Kia Motors, one of the three largest auto companies in South Korea. 
 220. Park, supra note 209, at 251. 
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even more difficult to roll over its short-term foreign borrowings.  On 
November 19, 1997, the foreign reserve of South Korea finally depleted; the 
government had no choice but to seek assistance from the IMF.221  
To obtain the IMF’s assistance, South Korea accepted the conditionality 
imposed by the IMF.  In the IMF’s view, the flight of foreign capital from 
South Korea resulted from investors’ loss of confidence in South Korea.  To 
restore it, South Korea needed investor-friendly policies to attract them 
back.222  Accordingly, IMF proposed a set of recipes containing large-scale 
financial deregulation and liberalization, including the deregulation of 
interest rates, free-floating exchange rates, the improvement of risk 
management and corporate governance of financial institutions, the revamp 
of the financial market infrastructure, and the establishment of an 
independent and unified financial regulatory agency.223 
Financial liberalization, however, was not the major rescuer of South 
Korea’s banking system.224  Foreign investors did not come back to South 
Korea, at least not immediately, after South Korea liberalized its financial 
sector.225  Instead, it was the government’s massive intervention that saved 
South Korea’s economy.  To rescue the dying banking system, the South 
Korean government took several measures.226  First, it guaranteed all 
deposits by establishing the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (“KDIC”) 
in 1996 to introduce deposit insurance to protect depositors of banking and 
non-banking institutions.227  Second, to rescue and recapitalize insolvent 
banks, the government nationalized eight commercial banks in this period, 
which increased the government ownership in the banking sector from 33 
 
 221. For a brief account of the events leading to the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea, 
see Park, supra note 209, at 246-51; Hong & Lee, supra note 205, at 206-10. For a discussion 
of the political factors leading to the outbreak of the financial crisis in South Korea, see 
Stephan Haggard & Andrew MacIntyre, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis: 
Korea and Thailand Compared, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
GLOBAL FINANCE supra note 126, at 57, 69-76. 
 222. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 228. 
 223. Park, supra note 209, at 286. Other measures included abolishing the ceilings on 
foreign shareholdings of a South Korean company, admitting foreign hostile takeovers, 
permitting foreign directors in financial institutions, etc. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, 
at 228. 
 224. See generally Kalinowsky & Cho, id. 
 225. It was reported that between 1997 and 2000, net foreign capital inflow only 
accounted for 5 percent of South Korea’s currency reserve increases. Id. at 230. 
 226. For a brief account, see Mayung-Koo Kang, The Sequence and Consequences of 
Bank Restructuring in South Korea, 1998-2006 – Too Fast to Adjust, 49 ASIAN SURVEY 243, 
246-55 (2009). 
 227. Kang, supra note 226, at 247. 
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percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 2000.228  To finance the nationalization, the 
government issued Deposit Insurance Fund Bond (a government-guaranteed 
bond issued by KDIC) in an amount equivalent to 28 percent of South 
Korea’s GDP in 2000, which was “one of the most expensive in recent 
history.”229  Third, the government restructured NPLs.  It firstly closed non-
viable banks or consolidated them with viable ones, which significantly 
concentrated the banking sector in South Korea.230  It then refinanced those 
viable ones by establishing the Korea Asset Management Corporation 
(“KAMCO”) to acquire their NPLs.231  Between 1998 and 2000, KAMCO 
resolved more than 45 percent of the total NPLs.232  These measures 
significantly restructured South Korean banks.  Only after the South Korean 
government cleaned up the mess did foreign investors return.   
After foreign investors returned, the South Korean government began 
to sell its ownership of South Korean banks to foreign investors.  The South 
Korean government promised to IMF that the nationalization of South 
Korean banks was meant to be temporary.  Domestic capital, however, was 
inadequate to acquire the government’s ownership.  The government thus 
turned to foreign investors.233  Foreign ownership of South Korean banks 
accordingly skyrocketed.  By 2005, among the seven biggest commercial 
banks in South Korea, six of them were majority-owned by foreign 
investors.234  In 2006, foreign investors held 65 percent of the ownership in 
the entire commercial banking sector; in 1998 this figure was only 18 
percent.235  By 2011, among the largest four commercial banks in South 
Korea, i.e. Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana, foreign ownership became 
dominant, ranging from 67 percent in Hana to 22 percent in Woori.236  In 
 
 228. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 230. 
 229. Id. at 231. 
 230. After series of closure and consolidation, the number of banks was reduced to 7 
nationwide commercial banks and 5 regional banks by 2007, with the four largest banks (i.e., 
Kookmin, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana) accounting for more than 70 percent of bank assets in 
2010. Park, supra note 209, at 238. 
 231. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 231-33. 
 232. Kang, supra note 226, at 251. For an account of the process adopted by KAMCO to 
acquire and resolve these NPLs, see Kang, id. at 251-55. 
 233. Chaebol perhaps had enough capital to buy out these banks, but this was politically 
inviable. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 233. For further discussion of the rationale 
behind the swift sales to foreign investors, see Kang, id. at 262-65; Lim, supra note 210, at 
90-95. 
 234. Lim, supra note 210, at 89-90. 
 235. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 234. 
 236. Park, supra note 209, at 244. 
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sum, after the Asian Financial Crisis, foreign capitals replaced the 
government and became the major owner of South Korea’s banking sector.237   
The impact of these crisis-driven and IMF-guided reforms is profound 
for South Korea’s economy.  After privatizing banks to foreign capitals, the 
government’s ownership largely shrank.  Financial liberalization further 
compromised South Korean banks’ support for investment.  For instance, 
loans to corporate sectors dropped sharply while bank funds increasingly 
flowed to household and mortgage loans, which contributed to the credit card 
crisis in 2003 and the mortgage crisis in 2005-2008.238  Most importantly, 
they dismantled the developmental state in South Korea, in particular, the 
collusive arrangement among the government, chaebols, and banks.239  The 
government’s reduced ownership of South Korean banks compromised its 
ability to implement industrial policies; it accordingly had to turn to other 
fiscal measures, such as subsidies, to fund industrial policies.240 
In sum, South Korea’s large-scale banking reform was a product of 
democratic transition, change of political leader, and financial crisis.  South 
Korea’s presidential election in 1997 for the first time elected the dissident 
Kim Dae Jung as the president, who was long against the authoritarian and 
chaebol-led economy.  The financial crisis allowed him to introduce IMF and 
foreign investors to counterbalance the vested interests led by chaebol.  
Chaebol’s excessive expansion and poor risk management, which eventually 
led to the financial crisis, also discredited chaebol and weakened their 
political legitimacy.  Only under this political setting did the reduction of the 
government’s role and financial liberalization become politically feasible in 
South Korea.241  Moreover, South Korea’s case also suggests that an 
economy needs to be cautious before liberalizing its capital account.  
Specifically, before liberalizing its financial sectors, an efficient and 
independent system of financial regulation must be in place.242  A “wrongly 
 
 237. Despite their large ownership in aggregate, they do not control the management of 
South Korean banks. Park, supra note 209, at 244-45. 
 238. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 239-40. See also Kang, supra note 226, at 
244-45, 258-60. 
 239. Park, supra note 209, at 286. 
 240. Karl J. Fields, Not of a Piece: Developmental States, Industrial Policy and Evolving 
Patterns of Capitalism in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, in EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM: DIVERSITY, 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 46, 54-56 (Andrew Walter & Xiaoke Zhang eds., 2012). 
 241. For an account of the political economy behind the post-financial-crisis reform in 
South Korea, see id. at 234-37. 
 242. Park, supra note 209, at 292-93 (highlighting that this includes an efficient system 
of both micro- and macro-prudential regulations and a regime of capital controls and foreign 
exchange market interventions to better counter the high degree of capital movements, 
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sequenced liberalization,” which partially withdrew the government’s 
control of capital flows without necessary supervisory measures, may be 
fatal.243  
 
b.Taiwan: A Politics-driven Evolution Featuring Market Entry 
 
In the course of Taiwan’s development, the Taiwanese government also 
reduced its intervention in the banking system, though at a less significant 
level.  Different from South Korea, Taiwan was not hit seriously by the Asian 
Financial Crisis.244  Therefore, the Taiwanese government never had to 
privatize its SBs to rescue its banking system245 and thus manages to 
dominate Taiwan’s banking system even until today.  The driving force that 
modernized Taiwan’s banking system was politics instead of the financial 
crisis.246 
Taiwan’s banking system encountered drastic changes in the 1990s.247  
Before 1991, there were only 10 commercial banks and 12 specialized banks 
in Taiwan; among them, the Taiwanese government owned all of them except 
for four commercial banks.248  In 1991 and 1992, however, the “Big Bang” 
hit.  Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance approved the incorporation of sixteen 
 
together with access to short-term reserve-currency liquidity through participation in 
international cooperative arrangements to prepare for an unexpected reversal in capital flow.) 
 243. Kalinowsky & Cho, supra note 132, at 227. 
 244. This relative soundness may be attributed to the conservative banking regulation and 
supervision as well as the slow pace of financial liberalization in Taiwan. Lim, supra note 
210, at 98-99. 
 245. To be sure, Taiwan still ran into local financial crisis in the 1990s. Since 1995, 
Taiwan witnessed explosive runs in its primary financial institutions: between 1995 and 1997 
10 credit cooperatives and 27 credit departments of agricultural associations encountered 
runs, which forced the Taiwanese government to launch the first round of financial reforms 
to combat these problems. LAI, supra note 150, at 89-90, 96-98. The scale, however, was not 
comparable with that in South Korea during the same period. 
 246. For a discussion of how Taiwan’s financial system allowed it to escape from the 
Asian Financial Crisis but later on precluded it from large-scale financial reforms, see 
generally Lim, supra note 210. 
 247. Before the 1990s, the Taiwanese government sporadically opened the banking 
system to private financial institutions, in particular to foreign banks, overseas Chinese 
capitals, etc., but this openness was mostly strategic and small-scale. LIN, supra note 150, at 
35-41. Financial liberalization and bank privatization, which already took place in South 
Korea in the 1980s, did not happen in Taiwan in that period. And one reason why Taiwan did 
not follow South Korea in denationalizing the banks during the 1980s was that Sun Yat-Sen’s 
philosophy regards banks as prime candidates for tight public control. WADE, supra note 140, 
at 261. 
 248. LAI, supra note 150, at 60-62; see also Yang, supra note 151, at 298. 
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private banks in two years,249 which significantly changed the landscape.  
After more than two decades of growth and consolidation, today these 
private banks have acquired equal market share with SBs.250  The entry of 
these new private banks, coupled with the interest rate liberalization which 
was already on the way, aggravated the interest rate competition in Taiwan’s 
banking market.  As a result, loan rates declined while deposit rates 
increased, which benefited both borrowers and depositors.251  Credit card and 
car loans also became more common, which benefited public consumers.252  
In these aspects, the entry of private banks indeed intensified market 
competition and improved the efficiency of Taiwan’s banking industry. 
Taiwan’s move toward this competition-based reform can be explained 
by at least two accounts: an economic one and a political one.  Economically, 
such reform responded to the financial inefficiency of SBs.  Taiwan’s 
primary financial institutions incurred some turbulence in the 1980s.253  In 
addition, as the economy went up, excess money flooded into fund markets 
through a variety of channels, including illegal underground investment 
companies, which resulted in the stock market and real estate booms (or 
bubble).  As a response, the Taiwanese government initiated banking reforms 
in 1989 to regulate illegal underground finance.  Liberalizing the private 
entry into the banking sector thus served as a way to introduce underground 
finance into the formal banking system and subject it to the regulator’s 
supervision.254 
Politically, the political fragmentation and reconsolidation in Taiwan 
during the mid-1980s weakened the power of the Taiwanese government and 
reduced the government’s domination of the banking system.255  Specifically, 
in 1988, the authoritarian President Chiang Ching-Kuo, the son of Chiang 
Kai-Shek, passed away, leaving a power vacuum in KMT.  After dramatic 
debates between different factions of KMT, Lee Teng-Hui assumed the 
president of Taiwan in the same year.  Lee’s power within KMT, however, 
was insecure because he was a local Taiwanese while KMT’s elders were 
 
 249. For a list of these new private banks incorporated in 1991-1992, see Yang, id. at 321. 
 250. In 1992, these new private banks only held 2.76 percent of deposits and 3.90 percent 
of loans in Taiwan. Id. at 322. 
 251. Id. at 320-22. 
 252. Id. at 320-22. 
 253. In the 1980s, there were sporadic bank run cases, including the notorious Taipei City 
Tenth Credit Cooperative case, the hugest bank failure case in Taiwan’s banking history. 
These cases, however, only involved trust investment companies and local credit 
cooperatives, which was relatively small in scale and did not pose systemic risks to the overall 
banking system.   
 254. See Yang, supra note 151, at 293-94. 
 255. See WADE, supra note 140, at 289-94. 
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mostly Mainlanders who could hardly respect Lee.  To solidify his power 
and defend against the opposition from KMT’s elders, Lee sought escorts 
from local Taiwanese businessmen.  In exchange for the political support and 
loyalty from these locals, he released financial prerogative to them by 
approving the entry of private businesses into the banking system.  The fact 
that fifteen of nineteen applicants managed to obtain approval of bank 
incorporation in 1991 suggested the ingratiation of the government toward 
local businesses.256  Although this rapid liberalization resulted in serious 
over-banking problems in Taiwan,257 it managed to reduce the government’s 
dominance of the banking system. 
During the same period, the Taiwanese government also began to 
privatize some SBs.  The motives behind were many-fold.258  The first one 
relates to the competitiveness of SBs.  Taiwanese laws treated SBs as public 
enterprises and obliged SBs to observe the budget, audits, personnel, 
procurement, and business regulations that apply to governmental agencies.  
They also treated bankers in SBs as public officials and applied public 
official laws to regulate the hiring, evaluation, promotion, and retirement of 
these bankers.259  SBs were further held accountable to several governmental 
agencies, such as Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Directorate-general of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Ministry of Examination, and Ministry of 
Civil Services, etc., as well as congresspersons, which compromised their 
operational autonomy.260  The entry of private banks into the market exposed 
the inefficiency of SBs.261  Privatization thus became a way out.  At the same 
time, to expand infrastructure construction, the Taiwanese government also 
faced fiscal problems.  Privatizing SOEs became a way to raise finance to 
balance the government’s budget.262  Hence, in 1998 and 1999, the 
Taiwanese government privatized nine SBs, representing more than 35.39 
 
 256. LIN, supra note 150, at 70-72. Lin also observed the capital structure of these newly 
approved banks and found that their capitals were from either industry, non-bank financial 
institutions, businesses, or the KMT, which were all business groups with special political 
connection. 
 257. Taiwan was considered the most over-banked market in Asia. Lim, supra note 210, 
at 100. 
 258. See YU TZONG-SHIAN (于宗先) & WANG CHIN-LI (王金利), THE EVOLUTION OF 
TAIWAN’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM (臺灣金融體制之演變) 209-212 (2005). 
 259. Id. at 223-25. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
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percent of bank asset and 35.05 percent of bank loans in Taiwan.263  In 
appearance, Taiwan achieved impressive progress in bank privatization. 
These privatizations, however, were mostly cosmetic, and the 
Taiwanese government never really relinquished its control.  As mentioned 
above, Taiwanese SBs were inefficient because they were treated as public 
enterprises which are defined as enterprises whose 50 percent ownership or 
more is held by the government.  As long as the government reduced its 
ownership to below 50 percent, the problems were solved and the Taiwanese 
government did not need to relinquish its dominance over these privatized 
banks.  Accordingly, after the privatization, the Taiwanese government 
remained the largest shareholder of these banks and dominated their 
operation.  Among the privatized banks, except for Taipei Bank, the majority 
board members remained the government’s representatives.264  Hence, 
despite some “privatization” cases, the Taiwanese government’s control over 
these privatized banks did not fundamentally alter. 
In the 2000s, when the opposition party Democratic Progressive Party 
(“DPP”) for the first time won the presidential election and became the ruling 
party in Taiwan, the pace of privatization mildly accelerated.  In 2004, 
President Chen Shui-Bian declared to launch the second round of financial 
reforms, which included cutting the number of SBs by half by the end of 
2005.  Unfortunately, the new administration’s efforts largely went in vain 
after the scandals of corruption broke out in 2006.265  Several senior officials, 
including the president Chen Shui-Bian and the first lady Wu Shu-Chen, 
were found receiving bribes from entrepreneurs on different occasions, 
including in several consolidation transactions between financial 
institutions.  These scandals seriously discredited President Chen and DPP 
and directly resulted in DPP’s loss of the 2008 presidential election.  Due to 
the serious political backfire, the new administration suspended the plans to 
privatize SBs.  Since then, no bank privatization ever took place in Taiwan. 
In sum, Taiwan’s banking reform responded partly to the reduced 
competitiveness of SBs and partly to the political reform and 
democratization.  The transition of Taiwan’s banking system corresponds 
with the political reform and democratization in Taiwan during the same 
 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. at 226-28. Taking First Financial Holdings for instance, as of 2016, the 
Ministry of Finance, together with the government-owned Taiwan Bank, held 18.94 percent 
of its issued shares, but the MOF and Taiwan Bank together appointed 9 of 12 directors of the 
First Financial Holding, including the chairperson. 
 265. Other factors that obstructed bank privatization in Taiwan included the opposition 
from labor unions and the over-pricing of the government’s shares. See Lim, supra note 210, 
at 101-02. 
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period, which indicated that the driving force behind was not only economics 
but also politics. 
 
c.  Singapore: A Policy-driven Evolution Featuring 
Professionalization 
 
Similar to Taiwan, Singapore was less hit by the Asian Financial Crisis 
and thus did not need to surrender its government-dominated banking 
system.  In addition, there are two major private banks in Singapore, UOB, 
and OCBC, as well as several foreign banks which compete with Singapore’s 
SBs (mainly the DBS).  What makes Singapore’s model unique, however, is 
the governance practice of Singapore’s SBs. 
Although the Asian Financial Crisis did not result in a financial crisis in 
Singapore, the economic slowdown caused by the regional crisis prompted 
the Singaporean government to devote to enhancing the operational 
efficiency of Singaporean firms.  This led to three specific moves that 
reduced the government’s impact, i.e., globalization, divestiture of business 
lines, and professionalization of the management.266  First, in light of the 
turbulence and economic slowdown in Southeast Asia, Singapore shifted the 
focus of its industrial policies toward globalization to diversify its risk 
exposure.  In line with this policy, Singapore liberalized its financial sectors, 
such as removing foreign shareholding limits and issuing new full bank 
licenses to foreign banks.267  This introduced market competition and 
reduced the influence of SBs.  Second, to attract foreign acquisition, the 
Singaporean government also started to divest its holdings in GLCs, 
especially for non-core businesses which were “no longer strategic to 
Singapore or when viable market alternatives or regulatory frameworks are 
in place”268  Although the pace of privatization remains gradual and the 
effects remain mixed, the government’s role in GLCs reduced.  Finally and 
most importantly, to enhance the operational efficiency of GLCs, the 
Singaporean government professionalized the management of GLCs and 
advocated independent directors.  As a result, GLCs became more business-
oriented and less government-dominated.  In sum, the Asian Financial Crisis 
and the globalization wave pressed Singapore’s developmental state model 
to evolve toward a less-interventionist fashion.269 
 
 266. For a brief discussion, see Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 106-15. 
 267. Id. at 106. See also Chong, supra note 160, at 970-72. 
 268. Tsui-Auch, id. at 106-07. 
 269. Some commentators also argued that Singapore’s economy is not as splendid as most 
observers perceive. See generally Verweji & Pelizzo, supra note 164. 
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Similar reforms also took place in Singapore’s banking sector.  After 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the Singaporean government devoted to 
improving the corporate governance of SBs and introducing professional 
management.  For instance, it required banks to establish nominating 
committees to select and appoint board members and senior officers.270  
Accordingly, SBs increasingly recruited professional managers from private 
sectors.  For instance, DBS retained the former JP Morgan banker as its CEO, 
who led DBS to profits and recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis.271  
Thanks to this government-owned-professionally-managed governance 
model, also known as the Temasek model, Singapore’s SBs incurred fewer 
corporate governance problems traditionally assigned to SBs.  Instead, they 
appear safe, sound, commercialized, professionalized, and globally-
competitive. 
China is eager to borrow the experience of the Temasek model to reform 
its SOEs.272  Many Chinese reformers believe that the Temasek model, which 
introduces professional management to SOEs, can reasonably constrain the 
government’s intervention in SOE operation.  They argue that this model 
illustrates that “a highly successful economy and system of corporate 
governance can be built on a foundation of corporations that have the 
government as their ultimate controlling shareholder.”273  On the other hand, 
many commentators cautioned against China’s such over-optimism.  Some 
raised several complementary factors necessary for the success of the 
Temasek model but absent in China, such as high-quality public governance 
and contested democratic election in Singapore.274  Others attributed the 
overall success of the Temasek model to Singapore’s tradition of employing 
GLCs for pragmatic instead of ideological reasons275 and argued that China 
 
 270. Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 106. 
 271. Id. at 108.  
 272. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 62-63. 
 273. Id. at 64. 
 274. See id. at 93-94. See also Chen, supra note 167, at 362-65; Cheng Han Tan, The 
Beijing Consensus and Possible Lessons from the “Singapore Model”?, 10-15 (NUS Centre 
for Asian Legal Studies Working Paper, No. 2016/001, 2016). In particular, they emphasized 
that political liberalization with open elections in Singapore plays an important role for the 
PAP to detect the public’s reaction to its economic measures and fine-tune its economic 
policies, including its use of GLCs, toward public goods. Tan, supra note 274, at 15-17. For 
different opinion arguing that Singapore’s lack of true political democracy compromised its 
economic achievement and resulted in domestic economic problems, see Verweji & Pelizzo, 
supra note 164, at 29-31. 
 275. Specifically, Singapore established GLCs to address the market failure in Singapore, 
in particular, the inadequate supply of industrial finance from local private bankers due to 
their limited experience and ability. Since GLCs serve pragmatic purposes, the Singaporean 
government well-recognized the pragmatic limits of SOEs, such as the inherent inefficiency; 
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does not hold similar pragmatic attitude toward government ownership.276  
In sum, absent complementary institutions, the Temasek model could be 
incompatible with China’s situation. 
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of these explanations, they 
overlook a fundamental aspect.  Temasek model is business- and profession-
oriented due to the direction of Singapore’s industrial policies instead of the 
corporate governance structure.  As mentioned above, the Singaporean 
government sometimes exercised its influence in GLCs and DBS to support 
its policies, such as providing industrial finance in the 1960s and 1970s and 
supporting the going global policy after the Asian Financial Crisis.  
Accordingly, the Temasek model does not preclude the Singaporean 
government from intervening in SBs.  The difference, however, is that the 
Singaporean government exercises its influence in a business-oriented way.  
This is because Singapore’s industrial policy is different.  For other East 
Asian developmental states, including China,277 their industrial policies 
aimed at building domestic businesses and targeting specific industries for 
development, which incur protectionism and domestic subsidies.  For 
Singapore, its industrial policies aim at attracting foreign investment and 
becoming globally competitive,278 which require a global-market-oriented 
and business-oriented mind.  To pursue this different industrial policy, the 
Singaporean government needs professional managements to operate GLCs 
and SBs, which resulted in the Temasek model.  In other words, the Temasek 
model still invites governmental intervention, but the government intervenes 
in a commercial way to attract foreign investment and go global Singaporean 
businesses. 
The Singaporean government adopted a foreign-investment-oriented 
policy for a political reason.  Historically, ‘PAP, Singapore’s ruling party, did 
not want strong local businesses to challenge its power.  Before the 
independence of Singapore from Malaysia, local ethnic Chinese 
businesspersons were the most powerful economic and political interest 
group.  Politically, they opposed PAP’s policies.279  Economically, they 
 
thus it consciously evaluated GLCs based on their operational performance. Tan et al., supra 
note 165, at 83-84. On the other hand, Singapore’s attitude toward free trade and free markets 
is also pragmatic; see Wolf, supra note 160, at 1435. 
 276. Others pointed out that Temasek is incentivized to behave professionally and 
business-oriented because its investments have operation substantially outside Singapore and 
must abide by foreign laws. Chen, supra note 167, at 365-68. 
 277. BREMMER, supra note 16, at 138-41. 
 278. Wolf, supra note 160, at 1433-34. 
 279. Lee Kuan-Yew, PAP’s leader, himself was English educated and could not speak 
Chinese well, who could hardly win the respect and support from the ethnic Chinese 
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mainly engaged in export-import trade instead of manufacturing, which was 
against PAP’s industrial policy that prioritized industrialization over export-
import trade.  Accordingly, after Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 
1963, PAP maintained a policy that alienated ethnic Chinese business 
community.  To bypass this powerful business community without harming 
Singapore’s economic development, PAP embraced the two-legged policy 
and turned to multinationals and GLCs.280  The Asian Financial Crisis did 
not alter the above landscape much, except that it spurred the direction of 
Singapore’s industrial policy toward investing globally.  So long as 
Singapore’s policy remains connected to global investment, the Temasek 
model is a rational choice for the Singaporean government.  
In sum, Singapore’s banking reform is a response to the shifting 
industrial policies.  The direction of an economy’s industrial policies can 
affect the government’s intervention in the banking system.  In Singapore’s 
case, since its industrial policies concern foreign direct investment and 
outbound investment, the government tends to exercise its dominance over 
the banking system in a commercial fashion.  
 
B.  The Relative Theory Sequel  
 
The transition experience of these four East Asian developmental states 
completes the second half of the proposed relative theory.  It demonstrates 
the dynamism of economic development and the unsustainability of the 
development theory.  As an economy grows, the advantages of the state’s 
domination of the banking sector (such as centralized mobilization of 
investible funds) would gradually fade, while the disadvantages (such as 
incautious lending and low operational efficiency) would become more 
obvious.  If the state fails to find a balance, a financial crisis or even an 
economic crisis might occur.  The case of Japan and South Korea vividly 
evidenced this observation, but even Taiwan and Singapore reflected this 
point.  Moreover, the influence of economic development can extend to the 
political sphere.  As an economy develops, the political influence of private 
sectors would also increase, which produces different chemistry in domestic 
politics.  The corresponding political transition would also impose pressure 
on the government to readjust its role in the banking sector.  South Korea 
and Taiwan reflected this point.  In sum, to move the economy forward, at 
 
community. Tan et al., supra note 165, at 70; Wolf, id. at 1430-32. For more discussion of 
why the ethnic Chinese businesspersons opposed PAP, see Low, supra note 160, at 417-18. 
 280. See Tsui-Auch, supra note 167, at 101-02. See also Tan et al., id. at 79-84; Low, id. 
at 418. 
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some point, a developmental state has to reduce its intervention in the 
banking sector and let market function more.281 
China also had a similar experience in the late 1990s that supported this 
dynamism aspect.  After the Chinese party-state widely used the four largest 
SOCBs (the “Big Four”) to extend policy-based and political loans in the 
1980s and 1990s, the Big Four’s average NPL ratio skyrocketed to 21.4 
percent by the end of 1995.282  According to the official estimate, only 20 
percent of NPLs resulted from the Big Four’s mismanagement of loans while 
80 percent resulted from the Chinese government’s policy mandates.283  Due 
to the rapid accumulation of NPLs, the Big Four’s average capital adequacy 
ratio (“CAR”) dropped to only 3.3 percent.284  Technically speaking, China’s 
banking sector was already bankrupt.  To weather this local financial crisis, 
the Chinese party-state launched a series of rescue measures, including 
stripping off a huge amount of bad loans from the Big Four, capital 
replenishment, introducing foreign strategic investors, and listing.  In the 
course of these reforms, the party-state repositioned its role in China’s 
banking sector and introduced more foreign capital and private capital to 
marketize the system.  These moves were even praised by some 
commentators as a model for governance reform of SBs.285  China’s such 
relative success in SB transition evidences the unsustainability of the 
development-oriented SB model.  The transition will be necessary at some 
point. 
The chart below illustrates the complete story of the relative theory.  The 
horizontal axis reflects the development level of the economy.  The right part 
refers to a higher development level while the left part refers to a lower 
development level.  The vertical axis reflects the developmental efficiency 
of a sector.  The upper part refers to higher efficiency in supporting economic 
development while the bottom part refers to lower efficiency.  As the chart 
exhibits, in the early development phase, the state sector might possess 
relative efficiency over the private sector as the development theory predicts.  
Nevertheless, as an economy develops and passes the critical intersection 
point, the state sector would become less efficient as the property right theory 
predicts.  At that point, the state needs to either reduce its role in the banking 
 
 281. For an analysis of how the state capitalism cannot sustain for good, see BREMMER, 
supra note 16, at 171-77. 
 282. LI ZHI-HUI, DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM OF CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM 108 (2012). 
 283. LIU, supra note 69, at 72. 
 284. LI, supra note 282, at 108. 
 285. See generally Franklin Allen et al., The IPO of Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China and the “Chinese Model” of Privatizing Large Financial Institutions, EUROPEAN J. FIN. 
1 (2014). 
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sector or at least introduce necessary institutions to improve its efficiency as 
the revised property right theory suggests.  In either case, the state needs to 
take some form of transition. 
 
 
That said, the relative theory does not predict any single form of 
transition.  Specifically, ownership privatization, the best practice 
prescription under the Washington Consensus,286 is not the only viable 
option.  As the revised property right theory has noted, state ownership of 
banks is not always harmful, depending on the financial and political 
institutions of an economy.  Consequently, instead of privatizing SBs, an 
economy can alternatively improve other institutions.287  The World Bank 
 
 286. John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN 
ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 16 (John Williamson ed., 1990). 
 287. Bank privatization has its controversies. Empirical evidence found that privatized 
banks did not necessarily produce superior financial performance. James A. Verbrugge, et al., 
State Ownership and the Financial Performance of Privatized Banks: An Empirical Analysis 
(World Bank/Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference on Banking Privatization, 
Washington, DC, March 15th & 16th, 1999) (finding that bank privatization in the 1990s 
generally improved the operational and financial performance of privatized banks, but such 
improvement was less pronounced than non-bank privatizations). Specifically, in developing 
Early Development Phase Critical Intersection Late Development Phase
Relative Theory
State Sector Private Sector
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researches, for example, have shifted their focus to corporate governance 
reforms of SBs to substitute commercialization for privatization.288  That the 
state needs to readjust its role in the banking sector does not necessarily mean 
that it has to privatize SBs. 
The experience of East Asian developmental states again supports this 
point.  Each of them pursued a different pattern of transition due to their 
different economic and political background.  Only South Korea adopted 
large-scale privatization289 while Japan focused on regulatory reform, 
Taiwan focused on market entry reform, and Singapore focused on corporate 
governance reform.  Privatization is merely one of the means to the end of 
finding a proper state-market balance in an economy’s banking sector, not 
the end itself.   
It is perhaps the time for the Chinese party-state to reconsider its role in 
the banking sector.  In the past years, bad loans accumulated rapidly in 
China’s banking sector.  In six years, China’s bank NPL ratio has increased 
from 0.95 percent in 2012290 to 1.83 percent in 2018,291 almost doubling, and 
there have been no signs to suggest that this upward trend will cease.  Even 
more troubling is the pace of NPL accumulation in these four years.  Between 
2012 and 2018, the amount of NPLs has increased by more than RMB 1.5 
trillion.  Controlling the financial risks in China’s banking sector has become 
 
countries, it is found that bank privatization failed to produce superior financial and operating 
performance; often time the performance deteriorated. William L. Megginson, The 
Economics of Bank Privatization, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1931, 1951-58 (2005) (although it 
also indicated that some studies found the superior performance of privatized banks in 
transitional countries). Privatized banks in developing countries, compared with those in 
developed countries, undertook more excessive risks. See generally Issac Otchere, 
Competitive and Value Effects of Bank Privatization in Developed Countries, 33 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 2373 (2009). 
 288. Specific recommendations include: requiring a clear mandate, aiming at specific 
target sector, imposing the financial sustainability requirement, stipulating the rules of 
cooperation with the private sector, positioning SBs as a complementary role, promoting the 
participation of private banks, designing standards for measuring the public policy 
performance of SBs, and periodically reviewing the needs of government ownership, etc. See 
generally Herinz P. Rudolph, State Financial Institutions: Mandates, Governance, and 
Beyond (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 5141, 2009); Scott, supra 
note 41; Yaron, supra note 19.  
 289. Although Japan and Taiwan also adopted some bank privatization, the scale and pace 
were never impressive. 
 290. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal 
Persons) (2012) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2012年)) (Mar. 1, 2013), http:// 
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/7E1679F277BC4161982E2BCF068E5DDA.html  
 291. CBIRC, The Table of Major Regulatory Indicators of Commercial Banks (Legal 
Persons) (2018) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2018年)) (Feb. 25, 2019), http:// 
www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/doc/9106/910601/3954F0B0DF6C47F2AB36C1085791F448.html.  
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a primary task for the Chinese party-state.  At some point, CCP has to face 
the reality that the current party-state dominated model is not sustainable and 
start to experiment with a new state-private balance. 
In a separate paper, I proposed China to adopt executive reforms to 
transition toward a more commercialized SB system.  In a nutshell, I 
proposed CCP to recompose the executive team of China’s SBs and permit 
the private block-holders of China’s SBs to appoint more bank executives.  I 
argue that such executive reform can facilitate the deliberation between the 
party-state’s policy needs, as represented by party-state executives, and 
operational efficiency, as represented by block-holder executives, and thus 
help SBs to reach a better balance and safeguard their soundness.292  In 
addition, such executive reform appears to be the most workable solution to 
the rising risk exposure faced with by Chinese SBs now.  For one thing, 
considering that the size of Chinese SBs now is too big to be evened out by 
new private banks, the market entry reform as adopted by Taiwan is less an 
option to China.  For another, in China’s banking practice, the executive team 
plays a far more influential role than the board of directors in operating a 
bank; hence, unlike Singapore’s case, reforms in China should focus on bank 
executives instead of bank boards.  On the other hand, considering that the 
Chinese party-state’s back remains crucial for preventing market panics and 
coordinating rescue actions, large-scale privatization of China’s SBs as 
Japan’s or South Korea’s case is not a viable option as well.  Hence, 
maintaining the party-state’s presence and influence in the banking sector 
but progressively introducing moderate and credible counterbalance from 
private block-holders might fit China’s current economic and political 
situation the most. 
The U.S.-China trade war might offer a potential opportunity for China 
to gradually transition to a banking system that is less dominated by the 
party-state.  At first glance, this prediction might seem counter-intuitive.  
After all, the trade war can potentially deteriorate China’s financial sectors, 
and the Chinese-party state might tighten instead of relaxing its control of 
SBs to stabilize the financial system as the U.S. government did during the 
Global Financial Crisis.293  That said, as the pressure from the United States 
goes up, China might liberalize its financial sectors as a concession.  In May 
2018, as a response to the long criticism of its ceiling restriction imposed on 
 
 292. See Yang, The Cloud for Dragons and the Wind for Tigers, supra note 6, at 85-103. 
 293. And the government’s enhanced intervention can be an advisable move during a 
financial crisis. For a related discussion in the U.S. context, see Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang, 
Government Ownership of Banks: A Curse or a Blessing for the United States?, 10(3) 
WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 667 (2019). 
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foreign investors on the shareholding of banks,294 CBIRC announced its plan 
to abolish this restriction295 together with other liberalization measures relate 
to other financial sectors such as securities and insurance.  This amendment 
might progressively increase the influence of foreign block-holders in 
Chinese SBs.  In a similar vein, considering that the United States long 
criticizes the preferential lending practice of Chinese SBs and characterizes 
it as an outrageous state subsidy,296 China might consider reducing its control 
of the banking sector as a response in the future.  The proposed executive 
reform then may serve a middle ground acceptable to both the United States 
and China: China can use it to claim that SBs are no longer the state’s conduit 
and thus dilute the state subsidy argument while the United States sees some 
significant concession from China.  The impact of the U.S.-China trade war 
on China’s banking sector remains to be observed. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
China’s success in using SBs to promote economic development offers 
contemporary literature a chance to reflect on the theory of SBs.  The 
property right theory might be correct about the weakness of the state sector, 
but it overlooks that private sectors are likely to be even weaker in some 
settings.  In contrast, the development theory might be correct about the 
relative strength of the state sector vis-à-vis private sectors, but it overlooks 
the dynamism of an economy in which private sectors can grow and mature.  
By proposing the relative theory which highlights the relative advantage and 
disadvantage of the state sector vis-à-vis private sectors, I offer a more 
balanced view of the SBs practice.  Moreover, while acknowledging the 
potential benefits of SBs, the relative theory also questions the sustainability 
of the state’s domination of the banking sector.  The Chinese party-state 
should be cautioned that the success in the past does not guarantee victory in 
the future.  The proceeding U.S.-China trade war might push China’s 
banking sector closer to the critical intersection depicted in the relative 
theory, both economically and politically.  The proud dragon needs to learn 
when and how to repent! 
 
 
 294. Daniel C. Crosby, Banking on China’s WTO Commitments: “Same Bed, Different 
Dreams” in China’s Financial Services Sector, 11(1) J. INT’L ECON. L. 75, 88-96 (2007). 
 295. CBIRC No. 5 Order (2018). 
 296. For a related discussion, see Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Pin-Hsien (Peggy) Lee, State 
Capitalism, State-Owned Banks, and WTO’s Subsidy Regime: Proposing an Institution 
Theory, 54(2) STAN. J. INT’L L. 117 (2018). 
